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Highlights
• The crisis has hit central, eastern and south-eastern
European countries (CESEE) hard, though there are
significant differences within the region.
• In many CESEE countries the private sector was behind
credit booms that created vulnerabilities, but fiscal policy
was also – and continues to be – pro-cyclical. This amplified
both the pre-crisis boom and the bust during the crisis.
• In combating the crisis, CESEE countries face direct fiscal
impacts and changes in the international economic
environment. With a few exceptions (such as Russia and
other less-vulnerable countries), lack of scope for
implementing Keynesian policies has also been an obstacle,
though it is Keynesian policies that the crisis calls for.
• Like previous emerging market crises, the current crisis
should be an opportunity to introduce reforms to avoid
future pro-cyclical fiscal policies, increase the budgeting
quality, and raise credibility. These reforms should include
fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal
frameworks, fiscal rules, and independent fiscal councils.
• When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms
that increase credibility, non-Keynesian effects may offset
the contraction caused by the consolidation.
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Abstract:  
This paper describes the particular impacts of the financial and economic crisis on central and eastern 
European (CEE) countries, studies pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies, discusses the impact of the crisis on 
fiscal policy, and the policy response of various governments. After drawing some lessons for fiscal policy 
from previous emerging market crises, the paper concludes with some thoughts on the appropriate 
policy response from a more normative perspective. The key message of the paper is that the crisis 
should be used as an opportunity to introduce reforms to avoid future pro-cyclical fiscal policies, to 
increase  the  quality  of  budgeting  and  to  increase  credibility.  These  reforms  should  include  fiscal 
responsibility  laws  comprising  medium-term  fiscal  frameworks,  fiscal  rules,  and  independent  fiscal 
councils.  When  fiscal  consolidation  is  accompanied  by  fiscal  reforms  that  increase  credibility,  non-
Keynesian effects may offset to some extent the contraction caused by the consolidation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global economic and financial crisis is having a significant impact on all countries. However, central, 
eastern, and south-eastern Europe
1 (CESEE) has been particularly hard hit. The crisis poses a significant 
challenge to budget policies worldwide, and many countries, especially major economies, are relying not 
just on automatic stabilisers, but are responding to the crisis with discretionary fiscal stimuli and support 
for the financial sector. Indeed, the current economic environment would seem to call for Keynesian 
policies to counterbalance both domestic and foreign demand shortages. 
CESEE countries face significant budgetary challenges. Most have very limited fiscal policy options. Many 
of them face significant financing constraints, are small and open, have generally lower-quality fiscal 
institutions  than  major  economies,  and  should  respect  investors’  confidence.  Although  public  debt 
relative  to  GDP  is  considerably  lower  in  most  CESEE  countries  than  in  major  economies,  markets’ 
tolerance for public debt in emerging and developing countries is much lower. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the particular characteristics of the crisis in CESEE countries and 
the crisis's impact on budget policy. We argue that financial linkages and, in particular, large current 
account deficits financed by external sources, as well as heavy reliance on foreign trade and, in some 
countries, inflows of remittances, were the major channels through which the crisis hit these countries. 
However, budgetary policy also played a role: according to our econometric estimates budget policy was 
pro-cyclical in many CESEE countries, reinforcing the business cycle both during the good years before 
the crisis and during the current crisis as well. While some bigger countries in the region have some 
space for discretionary stimulus, most countries do not; instead, many countries should embark on 
significant fiscal consolidation.  
A key message that emerges from this paper is that the crisis should be used as an opportunity to 
accelerate the process of structural reform including fiscal reforms. With proper fiscal consolidation and 
reforms, non-Keynesian effects may offset to some extent the contraction caused by fiscal consolidation, 
and CESEE countries may be better positioned for post-crisis growth than major economies, though it is 
unlikely that the pre-crisis fast growth rates will return.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the severity of the crisis for CESEE economies and 
the particular characteristics of these economies that made them vulnerable. Section 3 studies the direct 
role of budget policy in relation to the severity of the crisis by analysing the pre-crisis pro-cyclicality of 
budget policy using structural vector-autoregressions. This is followed, in Section 4, by a discussion of the 
main channels through which the crisis impacts budget policy. Section 5 gives a presentation of the 
policy reactions of various governments. Section 6 draws some lessons for budget policy from previous 
emerging market crises. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some thoughts on the appropriate budget 
policy from a more normative perspective. The appendix details for all 26 CESEE countries the budget 
measures taken in response to the crisis. 
                                                       
1  This paper analyses 26 countries of central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe: 12 central European and Baltic 
members  of  the  EU  (Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), the seven European CIS countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine), five non-EU countries of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia; data for Kosovo is not available), and Turkey and Albania.   4 
2. THE CRISIS IN CESEE COUNTRIES 
2.1 Severity of the crisis: more serious than in other regions 
CESEE countries have been hit severely by the crisis, though there are significant differences within the 
region. Before the crisis, i.e. up to 2007, CESEE countries seemed to be catching-up with the EU-15 
quickly  and  reasonably  smoothly;  this  was  reflected  in  forecasts  made  at  that  time  (Figure  1).  For 
example, in October 2007, cumulative GDP growth from 2008 to 2010 was forecast to be 11.4 percent on 
average in the region, while, by comparison, the EU-15 was predicted to grow by 4.3 percent during 
these two years. Some CESEE countries had built up various vulnerabilities, such as huge credit, housing 
and  consumption  booms  and  thus  high  current  account  deficits  and  external  debt.  It  was  widely 
expected that these vulnerabilities would have to be corrected at some point in time. However, the 
magnitude of the correction, as also reflected by the fall in GDP, was amplified by the global financial and 
economic crisis.  
 
Figure 1 indicates that there were substantial downward revisions in economic growth forecasts from 
October 2007 to April 2009 in all countries. The 2010 GDP level of the CESEE country group was in April 
2009 forecast to be 14.3 percent lower than was expected in October 2007.
2 Downward revision in other 
country groups has been smaller, ranging from 3.3 percent (average of 48 African countries) to 9.7 
percent (average of 25 Asian countries excluding China
3). CESEE countries not only had to assume the 
largest downward revision of their forecast GDP level, but the actual fall in GDP is also expected to be 
the greatest among emerging and developing country groups. The average GDP change in the 26 CESEE 
countries from 2008 to 2010 was forecast in April 2009 to be minus 4.0 percent. Meanwhile the 25 Latin 
American countries were expected to maintain their GDP level (expected to shrink by 0.1 percent only), 
the 25 Asian countries were expected to grow by 2.0 percent, and the 48 African countries and the 13 
Middle East countries were expected to grow by about 5.5 percent during the same period.  
 
The three Baltic countries were hit the most seriously with GDP projected to fall between 11 and 16 
percent from 2008 to 2010, according to April 2009 forecasts
4. Forecasts made in 2007 foresaw growth 
of about 15 percent during the same period. Furthermore, growth in 2008 was -4.6 percent in Latvia and 
-3.6 percent in Estonia and hence the total output fall experienced by these countries will be even larger 
than the forecasts for 2009 and 2010 would imply.
5  
                                                       
2  In our view comparison to a benchmark, ie, the downward revision of in the forecast level of GDP at a future 
date, is a better measure of the severity of the crisis than the actual fall in GDP. For example, zero growth has a 
different meaning for a country that has been used to grow and was expected to continue to grow in the future 
by two percent per year, than for a country in which these numbers are six percent per year. Nevertheless, we 
also show and discuss actual changes in GDP. 
3  China is included separately in Figure 1. 
4  Note  that  more  recent  forecasts  indicate  even  larger  falls.  For  example,  the  Economist  Intelligence  Unit's 
forecast, published in June 2009, suggests that GDP will fall between 16 and 20 percent in the three Baltic 
countries from 2008 to 2010. Since more recent forecasts are not available for all countries considered, for 
comparability we use the April 2009 IMF and DG ECFIN forecasts for all countries in Figure 1. 
5  Note that the October 2007 forecast level of the 2010 GDP also reflected forecasts for 2007-2008, while the 
April 2009 forecast is based on actual data for 2007-2008. This is the reason why the sum of the first and third 
columns of Figure 1 does not equal the second.     
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Figure 1: GDP growth as seen in October 2007 and April 2009 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on data from DG ECFIN and IMF. 
Note. October 2007 forecast for EU member states: DG ECFIN 2007 Autumn forecasts for 2007-2009; the 2010 
forecast was calculated by us assuming that GDP growth in 2010 will be equal to the average growth during 2001-
2009 (including the forecasts for 2007-2009). October 2007 forecast for non-EU countries: IMF World Economic 
Outlook October 2007 for 2007-2008; IMF World Economic Outlook April 2008 for 2009; the 2010 forecast was 
calculated  by  us  assuming  that  GDP  growth  in  2010  will  be  equal  to  the  average  growth  during  2001-2009 
(including the forecasts for 2007-2009). April 2009 forecast for EU member states: DG ECFIN Spring 2009 forecast 
for 2009-2010. April 2009 forecast for non-EU member states: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2009 for 2009-
2010. 
Country group values are weighted averages (using GDP weights). CESEE-26: 26 countries from Central, Eastern, 
and South Eastern Europe. ASIA-25: 25 countries from Asia excluding China. LATAM-32: 32 countries from Latin 
America. MIDDLE EAST-13: 13 countries from the Middle East. AFRICA-48: 48 countries from Africa. 
 
 
2.2 Why were CESEE countries the hardest hit among emerging/developing regions? 
The sensitivity of CESEE countries to the crisis is mainly due to three factors:  
1.  Capital flows and financial integration 
2.  Dependence on foreign trade 
3.  Migration and remittances 
Darvas  and  Veugelers  (2009)  demonstrate  that  foreign  trade  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  pre-crisis 
economic growth of CESEE countries, and that their dependence on foreign trade is greater than many   6 
other  emerging  and  developing  countries.  Remittances  are  also  very  important  for  some  countries: 
Moldova (34 percent of GDP in 2007), Bosnia/Herzegovina (17 percent), Armenia (14 percent), Albania 
(13 percent), Georgia (seven percent), Bulgaria & Romania (five percent), and between two and four 
percent for eight further CESEE countries. In this section of the paper, however, we concentrate on 
issues related to capital flows and financial integration. 
In general, CESEE countries entered the crisis more vulnerable than other emerging regions, although 
there are considerable differences within the region. A key feature of these countries is that their pre-
crisis  growth  was  associated  with  rising  current  account  deficits  (with  the  exception  of  commodity 
exporters), that is, the correlation between GDP growth and the current account was negative, as the 
left-hand  panel  of  Figure  2  indicates.  In  contrast,  correlation  was  positive  in  other  emerging  and 
developing countries as suggested by the right-hand panel of Figure 2. 
Figure 2: GDP growth and the current account, 2003-2007 
26 CESEE countries                                  152 other countries of the world 
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Source: author’s calculation based on IMF data. 
 
Why does the correlation between the current account (CA) and economic growth differ? As discussed 
by, eg. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2006) and Collins (2006), the positive correlation in developing 
countries could be related to three main mechanisms.  
•  A demographic shift to reduce the old age dependency ratio increases the labour force, which 
increases both savings and output, leading to a positive correlation between CA and growth.  
•  A productivity shock leads to higher income, but financial impediments limit investment and 
consumption, which again could lead to a positive correlation. 
•  A policy shift to export promotion, for example the avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation, 
boosts exports and output leading to a better CA position and higher growth. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  negative  correlation  observed  for  CESEE  countries  may  be  related  to  an 
institutional change (relaxation of previous constraints in accessing foreign capital) and a productivity 
shock. 
•  With the prospective and actual EU integration of ten former communist countries and with the    
  7 
better EU prospects of many other CESEE countries, the previous constraints in accessing foreign 
capital  have  relaxed  or  eased  substantially.  This  has  lead  to  capital  inflows,  which  in  turn 
contributed to investment, but also to consumption booms and, eventually, current account 
deficits. 
•  At the same time, and also related to capital inflows, productivity increased rapidly in most 
CESEE  countries,  leading  to  higher  income  expectations.  This  in  turn  resulted  in  borrowing 
according to the textbook mechanism of intertemporal optimisation. 
Indeed, capital inflows and GDP growth were accompanied by a substantial growth in credit (Figure 3). 
For example, the private sector credit to GDP ratio was 20 percent in Latvia in 2000, rising to almost 100 
percent of GDP by 2007. In the meantime, GDP also grew by about 10 percent per year in real terms on 
average.
 6 
 
Figure 3: Credit to private sector (% GDP), 1995-2007 
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Source: author’s calculation based on IMF data. 
 
Since the banking system has a crucial role in financing CESEE economies, its stabilisation must be a high 
priority. The key question is the role played by the budget in the previous credit boom and in the 
stabilisation of the banking system now. The previous credit boom was mainly related to the private 
sector and the ratio of government debt to GDP was generally low in the region (Figure 4). Budget 
deficits varied, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in many countries (see the next section of the paper), but in 
general the budget was not a serious problem (apart from some outliers like Hungary). Many authors 
even called for an active use of budget policy due to the large infrastructure investment needs of these 
countries, rather than for saving for rainy days. With the benefit of hindsight we of course know now 
that budget policy should have been more conservative during the good times.  
                                                       
6  See Darvas and Szapáry (2008) for further details on capital inflows and credit growth in the EU member CESEE 
countries.   8 
 
There is unpleasant asymmetry regarding the banking system: it was the private sector that incurred 
most of the debt, but the public sector has to adjust substantially and clean up the mess now.
7 This 
asymmetry is similar to the Stability and Growth Pact's failure (with its narrow focus on budgets) to 
preserve euro area’s stability.  
 
These factors call for strengthened regulation and supervision, as well as creation of institutions for anti-
cyclical budget policies. 
Figure 4: General government gross debt (% GDP), 1995-2010 
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Source: Eurostat, EBRD, DG ECFIN of the EC, IMF. 2010 forecasts are from the DG ECFIN (April 2009) and IMF (April 
2009). 2010 forecast for Armenia and Macedonia (FYR) is not available. 
Note. Countries are ordered according to their 2007 debt level. 
 
Despite  the  low  level  of  government  debt,  credit-default  swaps  on  government  bonds  (which  is  a 
measure of the cost of insurance against government default) have increased substantially (Figure 5). 
The huge rise in government default probability on the one hand, and the low level of government debt 
on the other, are puzzling.  
 
The most likely solution to this puzzle could be related to the risk inherent in private sector debt in many 
countries, which is (in some countries) held mostly in foreign currencies. The magnitude of the eventual 
bank losses is still highly uncertain, and in countries where foreign banks are prevalent, burden-sharing is 
an  issue.  Should  the  economic  outlook  deteriorate  further,  and/or  the  exchange  rate  collapse  (e.g. 
Baltics), or fall further (e.g. Ukraine, Hungary), then even deeper economic crises may emerge that could 
                                                       
7  For example, Latvia is trying to implement heroic efforts to cut the budget deficit in the context of a GDP fall of 
about 15%-20% in a single year.    
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lead to more bankruptcies, unmanageable bank losses and the complete drying up of foreign capital. 
These factors may end in a government default, despite the low level of government debt. 
Figure 5: Credit default swap on 5-year government bonds, 2 January 2008 – 9 July 2009 
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Source: Datastream. 
 
Indeed, government default risk is now related to external indebtedness defined as net foreign loan and 
debt liabilities (Figure 6). It is noteworthy that before the crisis the cost of insurance against government 
default was not related to external indebtedness. This suggests that risk pricing was done incorrectly 
before the crisis. 
Figure 6: Credit default swap on government bonds vs. net foreign loan and debt liabilities 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF and Datastream data.   10
3. CYCLICALITY OF BUDGET POLICY IN CESEE COUNTRIES 
A growing empirical literature demonstrates that fiscal policy in emerging and developing countries 
tends to be pro-cyclical, while it is a-cyclical or counter-cyclical in most developed countries. A pro-
cyclical budget policy amplifies both the boom and the bust phases of the economic cycle. During the 
boom  period  the  amplifying  effect  contributes  to  the  build-up  of  vulnerabilities  both  directly  and 
indirectly. It also has an impact if the faster economic growth that results from the pro-cyclical budget 
policy induces agents to expect a brighter future and consequently to borrow against their expected 
future income. During the bust period the pro-cyclical fiscal policy required by e.g. the external financial 
constraints, amplifies again the effect of the downturn. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) have coined 
this phenomenon as “when it rains, it pours”. It can not be optimal from any theoretical perspective to 
reinforce the business cycle by expanding budget policy in good times and contracting it in bad times 
(see Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008, for further discussion). 
 
Consequently, analysing the cyclical nature of budget policy may shed light on whether or not budget 
policy in CESEE countries also contributed to the severity of the crisis by amplifying the economic cycle 
during good times. It is instructive to start the analysis with some simple correlation measures that may 
hint at pro-cyclicality, and then to continue with a structural analysis. 
 
3.1 Correlation of output and government consumption using annual data 
Table 1 reports the correlation coefficient between annual real GDP and real government consumption
8 
growth in four different time periods. The sample starts either in 1995 or in 2001 and ends either in 2007 
or  in  2010,  where  available.  Extending  the  sample  to  2010  (with  available  forecasts)  provides  an 
indication of how the current crisis affects the correlation. Starting the sample in 2001 instead of 1995 
eliminates  the  period  of  the  Russian  crisis  that  affected  many  other  CESEE  countries.  Some  earlier 
country specific crises are also eliminated (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovak Republic). 
Furthermore, the transitional recession lasted till the late 1990s in the case of many CIS countries and 
hence the 2001 sample starting point implies a more homogenous time period.  
 
The general result for developed countries shown in the last eight rows of the table is a close to zero or 
negative  correlation,  regardless  of  the  sample  period  considered.  Hence,  the  simple  correlation 
coefficient confirms the a-cyclical or counter-cyclical budget policy finding that is found as a result of 
more structural analysis in the literature. 
 
In  contrast,  the  general  result  for  many  CESEE  countries  is  a  positive  correlation  suggesting  pro-
cyclicality, though there are exceptions. Results for some CESEE countries are different for different time 
periods, which make us cautious when interpreting the results. 
 
                                                       
8  It  is  preferable  to  use  government  consumption  rather  than  eg.  government  expenditures  or  balance,  for 
studying the pro-cyclical nature of budget policy, because these latter indicators are strongly influenced by the 
business cycle (eg. through transfers, debt service and tax revenues), while government consumption is a more 
direct policy tool. See Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) for a detailed discussion.    
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Considering the 1995-2007 period, a negative or positive but close to zero correlation was found for the 
following  countries:  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Croatia,  Azerbaijan,  and 
Georgia. The correlation for Turkey, the Russian Federation, Poland, Latvia, Albania, and the Slovak 
Republic was positive but not large. Large positive correlations were observed for Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation of annual real GDP and real government consumption growth 
  1995-2007  1995-2010  2001-2007  2001-2010 
Bulgaria  0.81  0.77  -0.25  0.29 
Cyprus  -0.54  -0.35  -0.37  -0.20 
Czech Republic  -0.21  -0.08  -0.59  -0.11 
Estonia  -0.18  0.14  -0.23  0.54 
Hungary  0.81  0.62  0.92  0.62 
Latvia  0.30  0.45  0.84  0.91 
Lithuania  0.69  0.83  0.13  0.90 
Malta  n.a.  n.a.  -0.01  0.24 
Poland  0.27  0.56  0.59  0.78 
Romania  0.09  0.24  -0.65  0.28 
Slovenia  -0.26  0.03  0.04  0.23 
Slovak Republic  0.43  0.40  -0.10  0.12 
Albania  0.40  n.a.  0.41  n.a. 
Croatia  -0.03  0.04  0.67  0.27 
Macedonia FYR  n.a.  n.a.  -0.64  -0.55 
Turkey  0.17  0.24  0.56  0.50 
Russia  0.24  n.a.  0.57  n.a. 
Armenia  0.57  n.a.  0.40  n.a. 
Azerbaijan  -0.15  n.a.  -0.29  n.a. 
Belarus  0.76  n.a.  -0.29  n.a. 
Georgia  -0.04  n.a.  -0.35  n.a. 
Moldova  0.76  n.a.  0.71  n.a. 
Ukraine  0.78  n.a.  -0.37  n.a. 
Euro area 12  0.04  -0.08  -0.06  -0.03 
Denmark  0.23  0.20  0.18  -0.08 
Sweden  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.07 
United Kingdom  -0.09  -0.38  -0.03  -0.46 
Switzerland  -0.26  -0.17  -0.55  -0.21 
Norway  -0.12  -0.55  -0.21  -0.63 
Japan  -0.01  0.24  -0.62  0.13 
United States  -0.34  -0.69  -0.70  -0.77 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note. Data for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia is not available. 
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If only the 'good times' of 2001-2007 are considered, the results change for several CESEE countries. 
Correlation increases substantially compared to the 1995-2007 period in Latvia, Croatia, Poland, Turkey, 
and the Russian Federation. There are also countries in which correlation in 2001-2007 is substantially 
lower than in 1995-2007: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Belarus and Ukraine. Data 
for Malta is available for 2001-2007 which indicates a zero correlation. 
 
Including the recent crisis in the sample period generally increases the finding of positive correlation for 
CESEE countries. For example, among the EU member states for which forecasts up to 2010 are available, 
the correlation coefficient rises substantially in the cases of Lithuania and Estonia, and to a lesser extent 
for Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Slovenia, leaving only Cyprus and the Czech Republic with negative 
correlations, and the Slovak Republic with a small positive correlation.  
 
To sum up, although there are important country specific differences (eg. Cyprus and the Czech Republic 
were  found  to  have  negative  correlations  in  all  sample  periods),  many  CESEE  countries  indicates  a 
positive correlation between GDP and government consumption, in at least one of the sample periods 
we studied. In contrast, the correlation is close to zero or negative in developed countries, irrespective of 
the time period studied. 
 
3.2 Structural vector-autoregressions using quarterly data 
As highlighted by e.g. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) a positive correlation between GDP and government 
consumption does not imply causality. Pro-cyclicality would require a causal effect from GDP growth to 
government consumption growth. However, a positive correlation between the two variables may be the 
result  of  a  causal  effect  from  government  consumption  to  GDP,  ie.  the  expansionary  effect  of 
government  consumption.  Following  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002)  and  Ilzetzki  and  Vegh  (2008)  we 
employ structural vector-autoregressions (SVAR) to identify the effects of output shocks on government 
consumption using quarterly data. The model has the following form: 
 
t
q
j
j t i
p
i
i t i t x y y ε + + = ∑ ∑
=
−
=
−
0 1
0 B A A  , 
 
where  t y  is the vector of output and government consumption, which are assumed to be endogenous, 
t x  is the vector of exogenous variables,  t ε  is the vector of orthogonal structural shocks,  0 A  is the 
contemporaneous  impact  matrix,  i A   and  j B   are  parameter  matrices.  Our  sample  period  covers 
quarterly data between the first quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 2009, where available (Box 1 
below details data availabilities).
9 A few key assumptions have to be made for the use of the SVAR. 
 
                                                       
9  Quarterly data before 1995  is generally not available for CESEE countries, but even if available, it  is likely 
burdened with substantial structural changes. Still, our sample starting in 1995 may also include structural 
breaks due to, for example, changes in fiscal policy regimes, which would necessitate time-varying parameter 
SVARs. This issue is left for further research.     
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Identification of shocks: Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) we assumed 
that  an  unexpected  shock
10  to  GDP  does  not  have  a  contemporaneous  effect  on  government 
consumption,  but  an  unexpected  shock  to  government  consumption  may  affect  GDP 
contemporaneously. 
 
Measurement of variables: In contrast to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) who de-trended GDP and government 
consumption using linear and quadratic trends before making estimates, we included the variables in 
log-levels. There are various de-trending methods adopted in the literature, and empirical results might 
depend  on  the  specific  filter  adopted,  as  demonstrated  in  Canova  (1998).  Estimates  for  the  levels, 
however, is consistent irrespective of whether or not there is a co-integrating relationship among the 
variables, though in small samples the estimate may be biased. 
 
Exogenous variable(s): We include only one exogenous variable, the weighted average of EU15, US, 
Russian and Japanese GDP. The weights are proportional to trade weights. We did not include all trading 
partners in the weighted foreign GDP for reasons of endogeneity. For example, the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic have substantial bilateral trade relations, but, eg, GDP development in the Slovak 
Republic  is  likely  not  exogenous  to  GDP  movements  in  the  Czech  Republic.  In  contrast,  GDP 
developments in EU15, US, Russian Federation and Japan can be regarded as exogenous with respect to 
economic developments in CESEE countries. These four main economic regions represent, on average, 
67 percent of total trade of the 26 CESEE countries, and hence the bulk of external demand is captured. 
 
Lag length: We used Schwarz information criterion to determine the lag length.
11  
 
Figure 7 shows the response of government consumption to an unanticipated GDP shock for the 20 
CESEE countries for which quarterly data is available. The results are broadly consistent with our earlier 
findings  shown  in  Table  1.  With  a  few  exceptions,  government  consumption  reacted  positively  to 
unexpected GDP shocks. The most pro-cyclical budget policy was observed in Hungary: a one percent 
positive GDP shock caused a more than three percentage point rise in government consumption at the 
two-year horizon, according to the point estimate, though the confidence band is very wide. The positive 
effect is sizable in many other countries as well. The key exceptions are Croatia (which is found to be a-
cyclical), the Czech Republic and Estonia (in which the point estimates of the impulse responses are very 
close to zero with a wide confidence band), Cyprus (which shows an initial counter-cyclical reaction 
followed by a delayed pro-cyclicality at about 1.5 years after the shock
12), and Romania (in which a 
contemporaneous pro-cyclical impact is followed by a small and insignificant counter-cyclical response).  
 
                                                       
10  Note that impulse response functions in VARs measure the effects of unanticipated shocks. 
11  In  the  case  of  Poland  the  Schwarz  information  criterion  suggested  two  lags.  However,  with  two  lags  the 
estimated model turned out to have an unstable root, and the impulse response functions became explosive. 
We therefore used only one lag for Poland.  
12  Using a panel of developed countries, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) also found such a pattern.    14
Figure 7: Response of government consumption to a one percentage point shock in GDP 
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Note. The panels show the response of government consumption to a one percentage point shock in GDP as a 
function of the time (measured in quarters) after the shock. Dashed lines represent +/- two standard deviations 
confidence band. The sample period for each country is detailed in Box 1. Data for Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Macedonia FYR, Montenegro, and Serbia is not available. 
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Box 1: Data sources and availability for the empirical estimates 
 
We aimed to collect seasonally and working day adjusted quarterly GDP and government consumption figures at constant 
prices for the 1995Q1-2009Q1 period. The table below details our data. 
Country   Availability   Source  Note 
Bulgaria  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat (only raw data –not seasonally 
and working day adjusted– is available) 
Seasonal adjustment by us using the 
Census X12 method 
Cyprus  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Czech Republic  1996Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Estonia  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Hungary  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Latvia  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Lithuania  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Malta  2000Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Poland  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Romania  1998Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat (only raw data –not seasonally 
and working day adjusted– is available) 
Seasonal adjustment by us using the 
Census X12 method 
Slovenia  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Slovak Republic  1995Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat   
Croatia  1997Q1-2009Q1  Eurostat (only raw data –not seasonally 
and working day adjusted– is available) 
Seasonal adjustment by us using the 
Census X12 method 
Turkey  1995Q1-2009Q1  Central Statistical Office of Turkey (only 
raw  data  –not  seasonally  and  working 
day  adjusted–  is  available  at  different 
years’  prices:  series  at  1987  prices  is 
available for 1987-2007; series at 1998 
prices is available for 1998-2009) 
We  first  performed  seasonal 
adjustment  using  the  Census  X12 
method of the times series available 
at  1987  and  1998  years’  prices  and 
then combined them into single time 
series 
Russian 
Federation 
1995Q1-2009Q1  Federal  State  Statistics  Service  of  the 
Russian Federation (only raw data –not 
seasonally and working day adjusted– is 
available at different years’ prices) 
We combined into single time series 
the data available at different years’ 
prices  and  then  adjusted  seasonally 
with the Census X12 method 
Armenia  1995Q1-2008Q4  IMF – IFS: unadjusted nominal national 
accounts figures and CPI 
We deflated nominal figures with the 
CPI  and  then  adjusted  seasonally 
with the Census X12 method 
Belarus  1995Q1-2008Q2  IMF – IFS: unadjusted real GDP, nominal 
government  consumption,  and  GDP 
deflator 
We  deflated  government 
consumption  with  the  GDP  deflator 
and  then  adjusted  seasonally  along 
with  the  GDP  with  the  Census  X12 
method 
Georgia  1996Q1-2008Q4  IMF – IFS: unadjusted real GDP, nominal 
government consumption, and CPI. 
We  deflated  government 
consumption with the CPI and  then 
adjusted  seasonally  along  with  the 
GDP with the Census X12 method 
Moldova  2000Q1-2008Q3  IMF – IFS: unadjusted nominal national 
accounts figures and CPI 
We deflated nominal figures with the 
CPI  and  then  adjusted  seasonally 
with the Census X12 method 
Ukraine  2001Q1-2009Q1  State  Statistics  Committee  of  Ukraine 
(only  raw  data  –not  seasonally  and 
working day adjusted– is available) 
Seasonal adjustment by us using the 
Census X12 method 
Data for the EU15, US and Japan is from the Eurostat and available for 1995Q1-2009Q1.   16
Why would most CESEE countries, in contrast to developed countries, pursue a pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
that might exacerbate the business cycle? Based on an extensive literature review concerning fiscal 
policy in developing countries, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) conclude that there are two main explanations:  
 
(1)  imperfections in international credit markets prevent developing countries from borrowing in 
bad times; 
(2)  political economy explanations typically based on the idea that good times encourage fiscal 
profligacy and/or rent-seeking activities. 
 
As  far  as  imperfections  in  international  credit  markets  are  concerned,  further  integration  of  CESEE 
countries into the EU could ease this problem. However, as the cases of Hungary and Greece underline, it 
is  euro-area membership that makes  a  difference. Both countries  are members of  the  EU  but only 
Greece  is  member  of  the  euro  area.  While  the  main  fundamentals  were  worse  in  Greece  than  in 
Hungary, Greece has fared much better than Hungary in the current crisis.
13 
 
On the other hand, many CESEE countries also pursued pro-cyclical policies in good times when credit 
from foreign sources was abundant. Consequently, political economy factors may be highly relevant in 
explaining the pro-cyclical budgetary policies of these countries. 
 
We return to the issue of euro-area entry and the need for improvements in budgetary governance in 
the final section of this paper. 
                                                       
13  For example, Greece has had much higher government debt and a much higher current account deficit (as a 
percentage of GDP) than Hungary in the past few years. Despite the differences in these two fundamental 
vulnerability indicators, Hungary experienced serious speculative attacks on its currency and government bond 
markets,  and  had  to  rely  on  a  multilateral  financial  assistance  programme,  while  tensions  in  Greece  were 
milder. Hungary’s current account deficit is expected to shrink from six percent of GDP in 2007 to three percent 
of GDP in 2009 and 2010, while Greece is still expected to have a current account deficit in excess of 11 percent 
of GDP both in 2009 and in 2010, according to the April 2009 forecasts of both DG ECFIN of the European 
Commission and the IMF. The government debt-to-GDP ratio is also expected to remain much higher in Greece 
than in Hungary. In June 2009 the spread over German 10-year government bond was 186 basis points for 
Greece and 668 basis points for Hungary. 
  While macroeconomic indicators were in many cases better for Hungary than Greece, Hungary was still one of 
the weakest among the new EU member states, and hence it was not surprising that Hungary was the first to 
turn to the IMF for emergency financing. Our calculations indicate that Hungarian fiscal policy was the most pro-
cyclical  among  the  26  CESEE  countries,  and  government  debt  was  also  the  highest  in  2007  (Figure  4). 
Government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) was also the highest in Hungary and not just because of 
higher interest spending. By using a proper method to compare government expenditures in four new EU 
member states, Kiss and Szemere (2009) conclude that the Hungarian government spends considerably more 
than its neighbours.     
  17
4.  THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON BUDGET POLICY: MAIN CHANNELS 
The crisis has through various channels had a significant impact on the budget policy of all countries, 
including CESEE countries. However the strength of certain channels varies across countries according to 
their specific circumstances. Figure 8 indicates the headline budget deficit numbers for CESEE countries 
in comparison to some major economies. Budget deficits outcomes are rather diverse and are related to 
a large number of factors, to be discussed later. 
 
 
Figure 8: General government budget balance (% GDP), 1997-2009 
-12.0
-9.0
-6.0
-3.0
0.0
3.0
6.0
9.0
U
S
A
L
a
t
v
i
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
A
l
b
a
n
i
a
R
u
s
s
i
a
E
U
1
5
T
u
r
k
e
y
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
B
o
s
n
i
a
/
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
i
n
a
M
a
l
t
a
A
r
m
e
n
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
S
e
r
b
i
a
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
,
 
F
Y
R
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
C
y
p
r
u
s
A
z
e
r
b
a
i
j
a
n
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
B
e
l
a
r
u
s
1997-2007 2008 2009
25.5
 
Source: EU member states and USA: DG ECFIN (April 2009). Others: EBRD for 1997-2008, IMF WEO (April 2009) for 
2009. Forecast for Macedonia FYR is from the EBRD (Spring 2009). 
Note. Countries are ordered according to their 2009 balance. Azerbaijan had a 25.5 percent budget surplus in 2008, 
but for better readability of the chart the vertical axis has a 9 percent cut-off. 
 
 
 
From the perspective of most CESEE countries, the impact of the crisis can be summarised as (1) a 
significant revenue shortfall, (2) changes in the global economic environment that have led to external 
financial constraints and less growth in main export destination markets, and (3) a significant change in 
the medium/long term outlook.  
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4.1 Direct fiscal impact 
The most serious impact of the crisis on budget policy has been felt on the revenue side. With declining 
economic activity, all kinds of tax revenues decline. Progressive income taxes and corporate taxes act as 
automatic stabilisers, as do unemployment and other welfare benefits. In addition, countries that have 
scope may engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus programmes to boost domestic demand. We believe 
that the current economic environment is a classical Keynesian situation that would in principle demand 
such discretionary policies. However, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 7 both the desirability of 
and the scope for such actions fundamentally depend on the circumstances of individual countries, such 
as their size and openness, the credibility and strength of fiscal institutions, and the level of government 
debt. Last, but not least, fiscal support for the financial sector (which is different from discretionary fiscal 
stimulus) has a crucial role, as the health of the banking system and its potential for credit expansion is 
crucial for the recovery.  
 
4.2 Changes in the global economic environment 
Changes in the global economic environment have important impacts on all countries, but especially on 
open economies. The crisis affects capital flows, risk premia, trade, migration and also the outlook of 
major economies. These impacts in turn effect the economies of CESEE countries, thereby limiting their 
budgetary policies. 
 
First, as we have discussed in Section 2.2, countries in this region in general have relied heavily on capital 
inflows to finance investment (and also consumption in many cases). The global nature of the crisis, the 
ongoing de-leveraging process, and the general reduction in global liquidity, have substantially reduced 
capital inflows and will even lead to capital outflows. For example, the April 2009 IMF World Economic 
Outlook  includes  a  forecast  for  capital  flows  that  foresees  substantial  decline.  These  factors  pose 
significant constraints on the ability to raise capital.  
 
Second, the capital that is available will be more expensive, and risk premiums are expected to remain 
considerably higher than their pre-crisis levels, implying a higher cost of capital for all economic sectors, 
including  the  government.  Indicators  measuring  the  risk  that  emerging  and  developing  countries 
represent for lenders, such as credit default swaps (Figure 5) or emerging market bond indices, have 
shown dramatic increases, suggesting a rise in risk perceptions. These indicators measure current risk 
perceptions, but it is unlikely that risk perception will decline to pre-crisis levels in the near future. Some 
authors argue that emerging market bond spreads and credit defaults swaps were unjustifiably low 
before the crisis and hence a return to that situation is unlikely. 
 
Third,  the  substantial  fall  in  global  trade,  coupled  with  moves  towards  protectionism  by  major 
destination markets, have an impact on a key pillar for economic success in the generally small and open 
CESEE economies. Central and south-eastern European economies in particular heavily depend on trade 
with the EU, while eastern European countries are similarly reliant on the Russian Federation. Their 
previous success was partly based on the building-up of (partly inter-company) trade relations. With the 
recession  in  western  Europe  and  the  Russian  Federation,  CESEE  exports  will  be  hit  seriously,  also 
reflecting the general finding that cyclical swings in small open economies tend to be greater than in 
more  advanced  economies.  Furthermore,  many  export  destination  countries  are  considering  the 
adoption  of  various  subsidies  for  certain  sectors,  which  could  further  distort  trade  relations.  Any 
undermining of the close integration of production networks within Europe, and the resulting job losses,    
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would pose a challenge to eastern countries. While this effect is in some respects cyclical, if recession in 
western  Europe  and  Russia  is  long-lasting  and  results  in  the  rise  of  trade-distorting  policies,  the 
challenges for CESEE countries will also be long-lasting and serious. Commodity-exporting countries, 
including of course the Russian Federation, have also been hit by lower demand and revenues for an 
uncertain  duration.  Furthermore,  in  some  of  the  countries  there  is  a  high  level  of 
specialisation/concentration of activities in a few sectors. Depending on which sectors these are (oil, 
cars, pharma, high-tech services, etc.), and how important FDI is in these sectors, this might affect their 
sensitivity of those countries to cyclical downturns, and the sustainability of their long-term growth. 
 
Fourth,  migration  may  also  be  affected.  Some  countries  in  the  region  have  experienced  very  large 
outflows of workers to richer economies, with citizens from the new EU member states and western 
Balkan countries heading primarily to western Europe, and those of CIS countries heading to Russia. With 
the economic slowdown in western Europe and Russia, labour outflows may slow and even partially 
reverse.  Remittances,  which  play  a  very  significant  role  in  some  of  these  countries,  could  dwindle 
substantially.  These  developments  would  have  additional  adverse  consequences.  If  some  of  the 
countries  in  the  region  experience  very  large  economic  contractions  over  extended  periods,  then 
migration outflows may speed up again, exacerbating the effects of the crisis and undermining the long 
term prospects of some countries.
14 
 
Finally, in addition to reduced capital flows, rising risk premia, declining trade, falling remittances and 
potential reverse migration, developments in the major economies may themselves have major impacts 
on CESEE countries. Major economies have accumulated huge budget deficits, as a consequence of 
automatic  stabilisers,  and  also  as  a  result  of  the  huge  support  given  to  the  financial  sector,  and 
discretionary fiscal stimulus in some cases. This has led to abrupt increases in government debt in major 
economies, which will require more countercyclical fiscal policy in the future to maintain credibility. 
However, prolonged budgetary adjustments in major economies run the risk of reducing growth for a 
prolonged period (perhaps after an initial rebound immediately after the crisis due to huge output gaps 
that will have likely emerged). Such a prolonged adjustment in major economies will significantly impact 
CESEE countries. 
 
4.3 Reconsideration of medium/long term outlook 
For all of the reasons discussed so far, the previous 'growth model' of CESEE countries is at risk, and 
substantial  downgrades  in  growth  prospects  compared  to  the  pre-crisis  outlook  can  be  expected.
15 
Reconsideration  of  the  medium-  and  long-term  economic  outlook  for  these  countries  will  have 
consequences for future budgetary policies.  
 
                                                       
14  Ahearne, Brücker, Darvas, and von Weizsäcker (2009) estimate the potential migration impacts of the crisis for 
new EU member states. They found that in the short run, the crisis is likely to lead to a lower stock of migrants 
from the new member states in the EU15 than would have been the case without the crisis, on account of 
diminished job opportunities for migrants. By contrast, in the longer run, the crisis is set to lead to an increase in 
migration from the new member states, compared to what would have happened without the crisis. This is 
because the crisis has undermined the economic growth model of those new member states that relied heavily 
on external financing to fuel their growth. 
15  See Darvas and Veugelers (2009) for a detailed analysis of growth prospects of CESEE countries.   20
Furthermore, the crisis will likely have lasting negative wealth effects on these countries. The fall in the 
price  of  certain  assets,  and  their  future  outlook,  should  be  evaluated  in  the  light  of  pre-crisis 
expectations for these prices. While asset prices will likely bottom out, if they have not yet done so, their 
future outlook is not just uncertain, it is also likely that there will be a downward shift in price levels 
compared to the pre-crisis outlook.
 16  
 
The fall in housing prices impacts especially those countries that had huge housing booms in previous 
years.
17  The  fall  in  commodity  prices  impacts  commodity  exporter  countries.
18  Wherever  foreign 
currency loans were granted and the exchange rate has depreciated, a wealth effect operates because of 
the increased debt/income ratio. Increases in the interest rate, both for domestic and foreign currency 
denominated loans, increases the debt service/income ratio. 
 
Many of the countries have funded pension systems, and the losses assumed directly challenge those 
who are to retire in the coming years. The downgraded prospects compared to pre-crisis outlooks will 
also have an effect. 
 
The consequence of all of these wealth effects is a downward shift in consumption patterns. The current 
crisis is different from a 'regular' bust in a business cycle. Consumption smoothing, if any, will work to a 
much lesser extent. Instead, heightened falls in consumption are likely due to changed expectations 
about the future, to wealth effects and also to the difficulties in obtaining credit (supply plus higher real 
interest rates).  
 
                                                       
16  At  time  of  finalizing  this  paper,  July  2009,  stock  indices  have  increased  substantially  from  their  bottom  in 
February/March 2009 and currencies also have strengthened in most countries. The future outlook of asset 
prices is uncertain. Still, the current levels of eg. stock prices are still just a fraction of their pre-crisis values. 
17  See Égert and Mihaljek (2007) on housing prices and their determinants in some CESEE countries during the 
boom years 
18  At the same time the fall in commodity prices improves the terms of trade of commodity importers.    
  21
5. BUDGET POLICY REACTIONS IN CESEE COUNTRIES 
Budget policy reactions can be understood only in the broader context of other macroeconomic policies 
and  constraints.  Due  to  the  substantial  revenue  shortfall  and  external  financing  constraints,  most 
countries simply do not have scope for discretionary fiscal stimulus. In addition, many countries face 
significant  confidence  constraints  as  well.  Eight  countries  (Armenia,  Belarus,  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine) have stand-by agreements agreement with the IMF
19 and 
Turkey is in talks. The loans granted under these agreements are conditional on the implementation of a 
comprehensive  economic  programme  aimed  at  ensuring  fiscal  consolidation,  structural  reform  and 
support for the financial system.
20 
 
On the other hand, Russia, a large and not-so-open economy with huge fiscal reserves (and low gross 
government debt, see Figure 4 on page 8) has scope for fiscal stimulus, and indeed has rightly embarked 
on a significant fiscal stimulus programme. However, as also highlighted by eg. World Bank (2009), the 
scope for further fiscal stimulus in 2009 and 2010 appears limited due to the remaining downside risks in 
the global and Russian economies, and the exhaustion of a large part of Russia’s Reserve Fund. Because 
of its low government debt, Russia has room to borrow externally, which is indeed planned for 2010. But 
while that is being done, longer term fiscal sustainability should be prioritised, which will require reforms 
to broaden the revenue base and ensure greater efficiency in public and social programmes.  
 
Figure 9: 3-month interbank interest rates, 2 January 2008 – 31 July 2009 
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Source: Datastream and National bank of Moldova. Note. The Romanian rate peaked at 49.81% on 20 October 
2008, but for better readability of the right hand side panel the vertical axis has a 30% cut-off. 
                                                       
19  The IMF programme for the three EU countries (Hungary, Latvia, and Romania) was part of a coordinated 
international lending programme. The EU and the World Bank contribute to all three programmes; Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland and the EBRD have contributed to the Latvian 
programme; the EBRD and the EIB have contributed to the Romanian programme. 
20  As a precautionary measure, Poland has applied for and received the IMF’s new Flexible Credit Line, which is 
granted to countries that adopted sound policies in the past.   22
 
In parallel with budget constraints, monetary policy reactions were varied across countries. Three-month 
interbank interest rates also reflected this (Figure 9). Some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Poland)  cautiously  cut  interest  rates,  while  others  had  to  raise  them  substantially  (e.g.  Hungary, 
Romania).  Monetary  policy  actions  were  determined  by  pressures  on  exchange  rates,  currency 
composition of debt, and of course by the credibility of economic policies and inflation prospects. Russia 
and Ukraine aimed for exchange rate stabilisation. Russia has lost one third of its reserves in defending 
the exchange rate. 
 
A recent IMF staff position note (IMF, 2009) assessed fiscal stimuli in G-20 countries and in a few CESEE 
countries. In this section, we first report the IMF (2009) results for CESEE countries in comparison to 
some G-20 countries. In the Appendix we report our own data collected from various sources, which 
covers all 26 CESEE countries. 
 
Table 2: G-20 Countries - Estimated cost of Discretionary Measures (% GDP, relative to 2007 baseline; 
IMF estimates as of mid-May 2009) 
2008 2009 2010 All three years
Saudi Arabia 2.4 3.3 3.5 9.2
South Africa
 (3,6) 2.3 3 2.1 7.4
China 0.4 3.1 2.7 6.2
Korea 1.1 3.7 1.2 6.0
Australia 1.2 2.5 2.1 5.8
Russia 0 4.1 1.3 5.4
United States 
(9) 1.1 2 1.8 4.9
Japan 
(5) 0.3 2.4 1.8 4.5
Spain 
(7) 1.9 2.3 … 4.2
Germany 0 1.6 2 3.6
Canada 0 1.9 1.7 3.6
Indonesia 0 1.4 0.6 2.0
India 
(3,4) 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.8
United Kingdom 0.2 1.5 0 1.7
Argentina 0 1.5 … 1.5
France 0 0.7 0.8 1.5
Mexico 0 1.5 … 1.5
Brazil 0 0.6 0.5 1.1
Turkey
 (8) 0 0.8 0.3 1.1
Italy 0 0.2 0.1 0.3  
Source: IMF (2009).  
Note. Countries are ordered according to the sum of the stimulus over 2008-2010. 
 
Table 2 shows that Russia adopted the largest stimulus among G-20 countries in 2009, and the sixth 
largest for the three-year period from 2008 to 2010. In particular, Russia’s stimulus is larger than that of 
the US, and of any single European country (as a percentage of GDP), both in 2009 and the three-year 
2008-10 period. 
 
Turkey’s  discretionary  fiscal  stimulus  is  the  second  lowest  among  G-20  countries.  The  June  2009 
stimulus, which is not included in IMF (2009) and hence Table 2, is estimated to be 0.3 percent of GDP. 
 
Saha and von Weizsäcker (2009) estimate that discretionary fiscal measures amount to 0.5% of GDP in 
Poland in 2009. 
 
The Appendix details for all 26 CESEE countries the various measures adopted in response to the crisis. 
Budget policy reactions vary substantially across countries. The less vulnerable countries (eg. the Czech    
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Republic) implemented discretionary stimulus measures, but most countries instead engaged in fiscal 
consolidation.  
 
Direct measures for supporting the financial sector were generally low or zero in CESEE countries (see 
the Appendix). Four CESEE countries (Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey) are included in IMF (2009) in 
this respect (reported in Table 3). As an integral part of its IMF programme Hungary gave the largest 
(among these four countries, in terms of GDP) support to the financial sector that required upfront 
government financing. Still, measures in all four countries have been dwarfed by the measures that have 
taken in advanced G-20 countries, which are reported in the last row of Table 3. 
 
The key reason for this discrepancy is that CESEE countries did not hold US-related toxic assets. However, 
domestic  losses  due  to  falling  income,  rising  unemployment,  the  bursting  housing  booms,  currency 
depreciation and increases in retail interest rates, increase the ratio of non-performing loans and lead to 
risks of huge losses in some countries. Again, there are substantial differences across the 26 CESEE 
countries. 
 
Table 3: Headline Support for the Financial Sector and Upfront Financing Need (in percent of 2008 GDP; 
IMF estimates as of May 19, 2009) 
Capital Purchase of Central Liquidity Guarantees Total Upfront
Injection Assets and Bank Provision (excluding government
Lending by Support and Other deposit financing
Treasury Provided Support by insutance)
with Central
Treasury Bank
Backing
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (A+B+C+D+E)
Hungary 1.1 2.2 0 4.8 1.1 9.2 3.3
Poland 0 0 0 0 3.2 3.2 0
Russia 0.6 0.5 0.4 7.6 0.5 9.6 1.7
Turkey 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0
G-20 
Advanced 
economies
3.2 4.4 1.2 18.7 22.9 50.4 5.8
 
Source: IMF (2009).  
 
The banking system has a crucial role in financing CESEE economies. Furthermore, due to the substantial 
foreign ownership of the banking system in many CESEE countries the behaviour of foreign banks is 
decisive for these countries. In recognition of these factors, there has been strong international backing 
for stabilisation of financial systems in CESEE countries, thereby easing the pressure on their budget 
policies (see Box 2). 
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Box 2. External support for the CESEE financial sector 
 
The EU’s commitment not to let any systemically important bank fail in the euro area, or in Sweden 
(whose  banks  own  most  of  the  banking  system  in  the  Baltic  countries),  the  commitment  that 
packages designed to help international banking groups can also benefit their subsidiaries, and the 
ECB’s liquidity support to euro-area banking groups, have also helped their subsidiaries in the CESEE 
region. 
 
Efforts to stabilise the financial system in CESEE countries (irrespective of the ownership structure) 
are supported by the joint action plan of the EBRD, EIB Group and World Bank Group, unveiled on 27 
February  2009.  This  initiative  aims  to  support  the  CESEE  banking  sectors  and  bank  lending  to 
businesses, in particular to small and medium-sized firms, up to a level of €24.5 billion over two years 
in the form of equity and debt finance, credit lines, and political risk insurance.  
 
The so called 'Vienna Initiative', which is a multilateral effort to secure financial sector stability in 
those  CESEE  countries  with  substantial  foreign  bank  ownership,  aims  to  stimulate  coordination 
between all relevant stake holders, including international banking groups, home and host country 
authorities, international financial institutions and the EU. The aim of the initiative is to develop a 
common  understanding  on  key  issues,  to  secure  the  commitments  made  by  both  international 
banking groups and home and host country authorities, and to coordinate a fair burden-sharing.  
 
Furthermore, agreements between central banks, most notably the euro/lats swap offered to Latvia 
by the Danish and Swedish central banks and the Swedish krona/Estonian kroon swap offered by 
Sweden to Estonia, are also helpful for the stability of the banking sector. The option of getting 
foreign exchange liquidity in exchange for domestic currency alleviates the pressure on domestic 
currency markets. 
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6. LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS EMERGING MARKET CRISES TO BUDGET POLICY 
Previous economic crises were a major cause of structural reforms in general and of the budget in 
particular. For example, Henriksson (2007) presents an excellent essay about fiscal reforms in Sweden, 
which were prompted by the deep Swedish economic and financial crisis of the early nineties. Kopits 
(2008) lists some examples from CESEE countries. 
 
Let  us  highlight  two  other  cases:  the  Russian  Federation  and  Brazil  after  1998.  Both  countries 
experienced serious crisis in 1998/99; furthermore, Brazil’s economic history since the oil shocks was a 
tale  of  crises,  instability, hyperinflation,  temporary  economic  booms  followed  by  serious  busts,  and 
serious  fiscal  tensions  between  the  central  and  regional  governments.  However,  despite  the  global 
nature of the current crisis, instead of asking help from the IMF, both countries intend to invest US$10 
billion  in  notes  to  be  issued  by  the  IMF  to  support  the  Fund’s  activities  elsewhere.  The  fiscal 
consolidation and reform, as well as changes in monetary and exchange rate policies prompted by the 
1998/99 crises, changed the position of these countries from potential and actual recipients of IMF loans 
to suppliers. 
 
 
Figure 10: General government budget data (% GDP) 
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Sources: Russia: EBRD (for 1992-2006) and IMF (for 2007-2010) except the primary balance, which is from the IMF 
in the full period; Brazil: Banco Central do Brasil (1995-2008) and IMF (2009-2010). 
Note. Gross debt for Brazil is based on the official method used until 2007 (this is still in use, though it has now 
been  supplemented  with  another  method).  The  new  method  indicates  that  gross  debt  was  between  2  and  9 
percentage of GDP lower between 2006 and 2009, in comparison to the former method, when data from both 
methodologies are compared side by side. 
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Russia’s fiscal policy was characterised by very high deficits before the 1998 crisis averaging 8.5 percent 
of GDP between 1993 and 1997 (Figure 10).
21 Business subsidies amounted to about 16 percent of GDP, 
with little social benefit. The external financial constraints posed by the crisis forced substantial budget 
consolidation and vital fiscal reforms.  
 
Consolidated general government expenditures were cut substantially from a peak value of 48 percent of 
GDP in 1997 to 34 percent of GDP in 2000. The average expenditure ratio over 1999-2007 was also 34 
percent of GDP and hence the consolidation turned out to be permanent with little time variation (Figure 
10).
22  The  largest  declines  in  non-interest  spending, compared to  the  pre-crisis  years,  have  been  in 
transfers to regions and in capital expenditures. However, wages, social transfers, and defence spending 
have also been cut. Many inefficient subsidies were abolished, levelling the playing field. Interest costs, 
measured  in  rubles,  rose  with  the  exchange  rate  depreciation  following  the  1998  crisis,  but  after 
rescheduling the debt, cash interest spending also decreased from over 4.5 percent of GDP in 1995-97 to 
about 3 percent in 2000. 
 
The government continued its tax crusade against the oligarchs, launched in 1997/98, with success. The 
government stared applying the tax laws to big enterprises, especially the oil and gas companies, which 
had  previously  enjoyed  individually  negotiated  tax  rates.  Substantial  progress  was  also  made  in 
monetisation and rollback of barter, which had risen to 54 percent of all inter-company payments in 
1998, but fell back below 15 percent by 2001, and continued to fall in subsequent years.  
 
At the same time, revenues were centralised away from the regions to the central government through 
statutory increases in federal shares of VAT and income tax in 1999, and through the introduction of new 
tax-sharing  rules  in  2000.  The  reintroduction  of  export  taxes  in  early  1999  and  their  subsequent 
expansion were major sources of higher revenue. A new aggressive bankruptcy law tightened the budget 
constraints. Later, in 2001/2002, a radical tax reform was implemented
23, measures were taken to make 
doing business easier and to secure property rights, and progress was also made with financial sector 
reform. Starting in 2004, most of the windfall oil revenues were saved in a Stabilisation Fund that was 
later divided into a Reserve Fund and a National Welfare Fund (of which the former was indeed used in 
2009 to cover the budget deficit). 
 
All of these factors and the related financial stabilisation of the economy have contributed to Russia’s 
excellent  budget  performance  in  the  post-crisis  period,  and  to  strong  economic  growth.
24  Still,  the 
reforms implemented in response to the 1998 crisis are not the end of the story. The Russian Federation 
still faces significant fiscal challenges and there is much room for further improvement (see, eg. OECD, 
2009, and World Bank, 2009). Furthermore, as we shall demonstrate in the next section, the Russian 
                                                       
21  Main sources for the Russian summary are IMF (2000, 2001) and Åslund (2007). 
22  By  studying  85  fiscal  consolidation  episodes  in  24  OECD  countries  since  1978,  OECD  (2007)  finds  that 
consolidations based on expenditure cuts, including social spending cuts, tended to be larger and longer-lasting 
than consolidations based on revenue increases. 
23  Key elements include reduction in and consolidation of social fund contributions, improvements to VAT, sharp 
reduction  in  turnover  taxes,  the  introduction  of  a  flat  personal  income  tax  at  a  reduced  average  rate, 
strengthened  excise  taxes,  amendments  to  the  profit  tax  that  reduce  the  rate  while  eliminating  most 
exemptions, and a new simplified system for the taxation of mineral resources.  
24  As OECD (2009) emphasizes, temporary factors have also contributed to the strong recovery after the Russian 
crisis of 1998, including the undervaluation of the rouble, low capacity utilization and spare labour resources.     
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Federation is one of the lowest-ranking of the 26 CESEE countries in terms of preventing corruption and 
maintaining the rule of law. The government has a crucial role in making improvements in these areas. 
 
Brazil also implemented very ambitious fiscal reforms after the 1998/99 crises.
25 In 1998 the federal 
government  announced  its  first  Fiscal  Stabilisation  Programme,  comprising  four  initiatives:  (a)  fiscal 
adjustment to increase the primary surplus of the consolidated public sector (in contrast to the pre-crisis 
close-to-zero and small negative primary balances, a primary balance target of plus 3.75 percent of GDP 
was introduced, which was later raised to 4.25 percent), (b) institutional reform, including social security 
system  and  administrative  reform,  (c)  redesign of  fiscal  federalism  based on a  comprehensive  debt 
financing and restructuring agreement with federal states and local governments, (d) reform of the 
budgetary  process  and  the  introduction  of  fiscal  rules.  The  primary  balance  targets  were  generally 
reached (Figure 10). The debt-restructuring agreement with federal states and local governments was 
the basis for the change in sub-national governments’ fiscal performances after 1998. The improvements 
were further consolidated after the approval of the May 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law, which set for the 
three levels of government a general framework for budgetary planning, execution and reporting. The 
law  called  for  sustaining  the  structural  adjustment  of  public  finances  and  constraining  public 
indebtedness.  It  comprised  three  types  of  fiscal  rules:  general  targets  and  limits  for  selected  fiscal 
indicators; corrective institutional mechanisms in case of non-compliance; and institutional sanctions for 
non-compliance. Brazil’s public sector had substantial foreign currency liabilities before the 1998 crisis, 
but it could gradually reduce the foreign exchange exposure to less than ten percent of GDP. Fiscal policy 
was accompanied by strict monetary policy with inflation targeting under floating exchange rates, which 
was again a fundamental revision of pre-1999 policies. Fiscal reforms played a crucial role in Brazil’s good 
growth performance after 1999 and in Brazil’s resistance to the current global crisis. 
 
 
                                                       
25  The main source for the Brazilian summary is Goldfajn and Guardia (2004).    28
7. BUDGET POLICY OPTIONS IN CESEE COUNTRIES 
In principle the current global economic environment calls for Keynesian policies. Although potential 
output is also likely to be falling in all countries of the world, actual output is falling to much greater 
extent. As a result, in many countries large negative output gaps are expected, and hence the fall in 
actual  output  is  not  just  a  case  of  correcting  pre-crisis  positive  output  gaps  that  existed  in  many 
countries, including the CESEE region.  
 
Furthermore, the development of large negative output gaps is not just the result of domestic factors. 
The current crisis is likely to be a once-in-a-generation event, affecting all countries worldwide. The falls 
in external demand and remittances are clearly external factors, as well as disturbances in international 
financial  markets  and  the  resulting  global  changes  in  liquidity  and  capital  flows  to  emerging  and 
developing countries.  
 
Temporary  discretionary  fiscal  actions,  as  well  as  monetary  policy  easing,  are  precisely  suitable  for 
overcoming  the  demand  shortage.  Many  countries,  most  notably  major  economies  but  also  many 
emerging economies, are rightly adopting various fiscal stimulus measures (see Table 2 on page 22). 
 
In CESEE countries, government debt is generally low in most (but not all) cases (see Figure 4 on page 8). 
In principle, this would provide even more room for discretionary fiscal stimulus. 
 
 
Having said that, the viability of discretionary fiscal stimulus in CESEE countries has to be looked at from 
the angle of country-specific circumstances.  
 
First,  financial  constraints  pose  unavoidable  limitations  to  such  policies.  Even  countries  with  low 
government debt levels and substantial fiscal reserves, such as Estonia, are seriously constrained by the 
revenue shortfall resulting from the unexpected depth of the recession. Contingent liabilities should also 
be taken into account when deciding on discretionary measures. The crisis has substantially increased 
the risk of further government intervention in the banking system. Furthermore, the debt level tolerance 
of markets is lower for emerging and developing countries than it is for major economies. Government 
debt defaults occurred at reasonably low debt levels
26 (see, eg, by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). 
 
Second, the impact of the fiscal stimulus on the domestic economy crucially depends on whether a 
country is large and closed, or small and open. In small and open economies the effect of the stimulus 
can easily show up in increased imports. The Great Depression taught us that protectionism can prolong 
the recession and hence this is not the path small and open countries (and of course all other countries) 
should follow. On the other hand, small and open economies can benefit from the stimulus implemented 
in their main destination markets through trade and migration links.  
 
Third,  the  results  of  the  fiscal  stimulus  very  much  depend  on  the  strength  and  credibility  of  fiscal 
institutions.  Figure 11 presents the four out of the six World Bank governance indicators on which 
                                                       
26  For  example,  among  recent  cases  of  government  default,  the  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  was  37  percent  in 
Ukraine, 45 percent in Argentina, 54 percent in the Russian Federation and 66 percent in Ecuador, in the year 
before the government default.     
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governments  have  the  greatest  impact.  Although  large  variation  is  evident,  in  many  countries 
government  effectiveness,  regulatory  quality,  control  of  corruption  and  the  rule  of  law  still  lags 
substantially behind the EU-15 and the US.
27  
 
 
Figure 11: World Bank Governance indicators, 2008 
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Source: World Bank. 
Note. The average score of all countries of the world is zero. Countries are ordered according to the average of the 
four indicators.  
 
 
Fourth,  related  to  the  previous  point,  the  potential  effect  of  stimulus  programmes  on  investors’ 
confidence should be considered. The weaker the stimulus programme is, the more likely it will result in 
increased risk perception and, eventually, higher interest rates and capital outflows. 
 
Fifth, as capital is becoming scarce, the potential for private investment to be crowded-out is also an 
important factor for countries facing external financing constraints. 
 
 
                                                       
27  A direct measure of the quality of fiscal institutions is presented in eg. Fabrizio and Mody (2008) for EU member 
countries (for which data is available). The index shows that some EU member CESEE countries lag behind the 
EU-15.   30
Regarding the above list of issues, there is a key dividing line between CESEE countries. On the one hand, 
Russia is big, has low debt and substantial fiscal reserves and hence may be less exposed to the risk of 
loss of investors’ confidence, especially since the rouble has been allowed to depreciate significantly. 
Discretionary fiscal stimulus was the right decision for Russia. Azerbaijan also has substantial reserves 
and its economy is still expected to grow substantially in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 1 on page 5).  
 
On  the  other  hand,  all  other  countries  have  much  narrower  or  even  zero  scope  for  discretionary 
measures, though there are important differences between countries. Poland and Turkey, for example, 
are larger countries than most of the CESEE, and their debt levels are around 50 percent of GDP. Such a 
debt level is higher than in many other CESEE countries, but still at a level that does not itself pose a risk 
of a loss of credibility, provided that the stimulus package is implemented in a credible and timely way. 
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, the latter two of which enjoy the sheltering effect of the euro 
area, also have greater scope for fiscal stimulus, as they did not accumulate significant vulnerabilities 
before the crisis. However, their small and open economy characteristics certainly limit the effectiveness 
of Keynesian policies on their domestic economies. Countries that have had to rely on IMF programmes 
have no scope at all for stimulus, and other CESEE countries should be very cautious as well. 
 
The limited scope for fiscal stimulus leads us ask if the crisis can be used as an opportunity to reform 
fiscal institutions, improve their quality and embark on a necessary budgetary consolidation. As we have 
discussed in Section 6, many previous crises prompted substantial fiscal reforms and serious budget cuts, 
despite earlier arguments that challenging interest groups and reducing public expenditures would be 
impossible.  
 
External financial constraints, while costly in the short run, help to expose the weaknesses of fiscal 
institutions,  and  prompt  reforms  that  have  the  potential  of  paving  the  way  to  much  better 
macroeconomic  outcomes.  The  crisis  is  certainly  very  painful  in  many  respects.  Unemployment  has 
increased dramatically in many countries; many people have lost their homes; many corporations have 
gone bankrupt, etc. However, the crisis, and especially its global nature, also helps in communicating to 
the general public the need for budgetary adjustment and structural reforms, including fiscal reforms. 
 
Still, there are limits, and highly pro-cyclical budget cuts during a severe recession should be avoided. For 
example, the latest forecasts for GDP falls in Latvia in 2009 are in the 15-20 percent range. The Latvian 
authorities decided to maintain the exchange rate peg and had no other choice but to rely on the 
international community for emergency financing. As the recession became much deeper than what had 
been seen up to the point when the programme was designed, the budget deficit widened even more, 
requiring additional and substantial fiscal efforts to limit it, so that Latvia could receive the subsequent 
tranches  provided  by  the  financing  programmes.  This  happened  even  though  international  financial 
institutions agreed to somewhat higher deficit levels. In June 2009 the Latvian parliament passed a new 
budget law with additional cuts. While much blame can be laid on the Latvian side for past behaviour (in 
particular, fiscal expenditures were increased substantially before the crisis and little was done to limit 
the credit boom and the huge current account deficit) the EU should be more flexible with regard to 
Baltic aspirations to join the euro area.
28  
                                                       
28  Euro-area entry criteria were set up in the early 1990s when the euro area did not exist and the EU had 12 
members. Intense discussion preceded the drawing up of the rules, and the end result was a compromise 
between economics, politics and simplicity. Now the euro area exists and there are 27 EU members, but the 
rules remain the same. It is easy to show that keeping the same rules in an expanded EU violates the equal 
treatment principle: new applicants have to meet tougher criteria than previous ones because two of the    
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Regarding budget policy options for the future, some general principles could be laid down.  
 
First, as a priority that is relevant both for the very short run and the longer term, the good functioning 
of the financial system should be maintained. At the same time, so-called ’zombie lending‘ should be 
avoided.
29 
 
Second, the crisis should be used as an opportunity for structural reforms to enhance growth in general 
and  fiscal  frameworks  in  particular.  Reforms  to  avoid  future  pro-cyclical  policies,  and  to  increase 
credibility and the quality of budgeting, such as fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal 
frameworks, fiscal rules
30, and independent fiscal councils, should be considered where such institutions 
do not exist. When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms that increase credibility, non-
Keynesian effects
31 may offset to some extent the contraction caused by the consolidation.   
 
Third,  protection  of  the  most  vulnerable  should  be  prioritised.  Unemployment  has  different  social 
consequences in rich and poor countries. In poor countries household saving is typically lower, and the 
risk of poverty is larger. 
 
Fourth, debates over healthcare and pension reforms should be re-opened, especially in countries facing 
serious demographic pressures. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
criteria are benchmarked on the ‘three best-performing member states of the EU in terms of price stability’, 
which have been interpreted in a special way: the three EU countries having the lowest non-negative inflation 
rates. 
  Furthermore, once a country is inside the euro area it can do almost anything it likes. The Stability and Growth 
Pact in principle limits the scope of government action inside the euro area, but not much, as many examples 
have demonstrated, both in the pre-crisis period and especially during the current crisis. Government deficits 
and debt are ballooning in euro-area countries. On the other hand, countries wishing to enter the euro area are 
subjected to extremely tough and painful measures in order to be able to join a few years down the line. 
29  On zombies see, for example, Aherane and Shinada (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2006). 
30  Kopits  (2004)  argues  that  fiscal  policy  rules  (if  well-designed  and  properly  implemented)  can  be  useful 
commitment  tools  for  emerging  market  economies  exposed  to  macroeconomic  volatility  and  high  capital 
mobility. They can be instrumental in avoiding myopic policies that result from dynamic inconsistency  and 
or/political  distortions,  and  in  a  broader  sense  they  can  help  to  depoliticise  the  macroeconomic  policy 
framework. Regarding the interaction of fiscal rules and fiscal consolidations, OECD (2007) finds that countries 
with  fiscal  rules  achieved  better  results  in  consolidating  public  finances.  Furthermore,  fiscal  rules  can  also 
contribute to better performance in a monetary union. As Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) have shown, when a 
country has a chance to run a substantially and persistently higher budget deficit than other countries, it likely 
creates idiosyncratic shocks that result in the business cycle deviating from that in the rest of the currency 
union.  This  would  violate  one  of  the  most  important  criteria  of  the  optimality  of  currency  areas:  the 
synchronisation of business cycles. 
31 The ‘non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation’ refers to increased private sector demand in response to cuts 
in government spending. If fiscal adjustment credibly signals fiscal sustainability and reduces the expected tax 
burden on the private sector, private sector demand may start again to compensate for the fall in government 
demand. Rzońca and Ciżkowicz (2005) present evidence that non-Keynesian effects were indeed in force in new 
EU member states. Giudice and Turrini (2007) study fiscal consolidations that have been undertaken in the EU in 
the last 30 years and conclude that roughly half of these episodes have been followed by higher growth. Their 
results indicate that the consolidations that turned out to be expansionary were more likely to have started in 
periods with output below potential, and to have been based on expenditure cuts rather than on tax increases.   32
 
Fifth, spending on pro-growth policies, such as education and innovation, should be maintained but 
rationalised so as not to destroy the longer term post-crisis growth prospects of these countries. 
 
Finally, long term fiscal sustainability should be highly prioritised. All of the above recommendations 
would contribute to this.  
 
How  to  do  all  of  these  at  the  same  time  when  significant  fiscal  consolidation  is  needed  in  many 
countries? There are some countries that did manage this during crisis episodes. Let us quote a sentence 
from Henriksson’s excellent essay on ‘Ten lesson about budget consolidation’ (2007), which was inspired 
by his active involvement in the dramatic Swedish budgetary measures that were taken after the crisis of 
the early 1990s:
 32 “The bottom line may thus be: if you have to consolidate, wait for a deep crisis to 
occur, and it will be easy to do, easy to communicate and easy to be re-elected.” The crisis is now here 
and the opportunity should not be missed. 
 
                                                       
32  As a result of the budget consolidation measures, government debt in Sweden turned out to be 53 percent of 
GDP in 2000 instead of increasing to 128 percent of GDP as was projected by the OECD in 1994.    
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9. APPENDIX: BUDGET POLICY MEASURES IN CESEE COUNTRIES
♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 
 
Country  Stimulus packages and/or 
support for the most vulnerable 
Spending reductions  Augmentation of revenue  Support for the financial 
sector 
Notes 
Albania  Increase in public-sector wages and 
pensions (Source: SETimes.com) 
totalling of 0.7% of GDP. 
2009 budget review aiming at 
revising/reducing overall 
expenditures to be finally 
approved during September 
2009 in parliament; Council of 
Ministers draft decision to 
prohibit tendering of 
investment projects after July 
31st, 2009; Order by the 
Minister of Finance to prohibit 
extensions/reallocations after 
July 20th, 2009; Cuts in social 
contribution rate by 5%. 
(Ministry of Finance)  
Council of Ministers approved 
a law to increase excise duties 
on tobacco, alcoholic drinks 
and coffee with an impact of 
around  0,2% of GDP (Ministry 
of Finance) 
Guarantees for retail bank 
deposits and savings of 
individuals were increased 
to 20,000 euro, almost 
doubling the previous 
coverage. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
IMF programme expired in 
January 2009, but the 
government has not asked for 
a successor programme (EIU). 
The IMF is advising spending 
reductions (SETimes.com). 
Fiscal rules: 1) Organic budget 
law stipulates that public 
debt, including guarantees, 
should not exceed 60% of 
GDP and 2) the amount of 
budget deficit should not 
exceed the amount of capital 
expenditures. The second rule 
applies to central and local 
government. The increase in 
wages and pensions was 
made possible by the 
contingency fund planned for 
the 2009 budget. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
                                                 
♣ Empty cells in the table indicate either no measures or lack of information. The first version of this table was compiled mostly by Maite de Sola, whose contribution is greatly 
appreciated. Comments and additions from delegates from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Turkey, and Ukraine at the OECD’s fifth meeting of senior budget officials from central, eastern and south-east European Countries, held on 25-26 June 2009 in St. Petersburg, Russian 
Federation, are also highly appreciated. Anto Bajo from the Institute of Public Finance provided additional information for Croatia, which is also greatly appreciated.   36 
Armenia  The IMF-supported programme 
includes an increase in social 
spending of about 0.3 percent of 
GDP (IMF), such as increased social 
payments, or subsidies for newborn 
children (www.armenianow.com, 
EIU). Credits  to help SMEs 
(www.armenianow.com) 
Postponing the disbursement 
of some funds for non-
essential projects (EIU) 
Practice of drawing up three-
year expenditure plans ended 
(EIU) 
The Parliament rescinded its 
Dec-08 decision to raise excise 
taxes on imported alcohol and 
tobacco to avoid reducing 
imports and then tax 
revenues. Tax reforms: tax 
administration, evasion... 
launched in mid-2008 
Reduce tax evasion through 
compulsory cash registers and 
incentives to prompt 
customers to ask for receipts 
(EIU) 
   Emergency loans from foreign 
governments (Russia) and IFIs 
(IMF stand-by agreement) 
(RGE Monitor, EIU). 
Pension reform to alleviate 
the burden on the system 
(www.armenianow.com) 
The IMF approved a $540m 
loan (5% GDP) to Armenia in 
March-09 under the Fund’s 
fast-track Emergency 
Financing Mechanism 
procedures, and the country 
let its currency fall by 21% 
against the dollar. This 
emergency funding came 
shortly after Armenia received 
poverty reduction funds (RGE 
Monitor). The amount has 
been increased to $823m 
(almost 8% GDP) in June 
(IMF). 
Azerbaijan  Increase spending on social welfare 
(EIU) 
         The effect of lower oil prices 
could force transfers from the 
State Oil Fund (EIU)   37 
Belarus  The government will limit reduction 
of social spending and income 
distribution. Healthcare spending, 
social subsidies and public-sector 
wages are increasing (EIU). Housing 
assistance for families with three or 
more children, non-cash housing 
subsidies for low-income families, 
and unemployment assistance will 
be increased (IMF) 
Reduce burden on businesses: cuts 
in turnover tax and introduction of 
a flat rate of income tax (EIU) 
Wages can be frozen; less 
extensive subsidies; 
substantial expenditure cuts 
are to be made -construction, 
maintenance costs and 
transport services (EIU) 
Import duties and tariffs have 
been increased (EIU) 
   IMF Stand-by agreement 
(US$3.52 billion, or about 7% 
of Belarus's GDP) initially 
approved in January 2009 and 
increased in June. The revised 
arrangement will support the 
government's economic 
programme and help Belarus 
contain the effects of a 
greater than expected impact 
from the global financial crisis. 
To reduce the resulting 
financing gap, the authorities 
will maintain a balanced 
budget in 2009, despite lower 
revenues; will keep monetary 
policy adequately tight; will 
allow more exchange rate 
flexibility within a fluctuation 
band which is now ±10 
percent around the parity 
rate; and will deepen 
structural reforms (IMF) 
Belarus widened its currency 
bank in June 2008 (RGE 
Monitor)   38 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
VAT burden is to be eased (EIU)  Public sector wage cuts, 
tightened eligibility for 
invalidity benefits. Measures 
agreed focus on fiscal 
consolidation and public 
sector wage restraint, which, 
in addition to ensuring 
stability in the short term, will 
also help put public finances 
on a sustainable path (RGE 
Monitor). 
Central and local governments 
have put forward a number of 
measures to cut spending 
(EIU), with the Federation 
needing to make the biggest 
effort (RGE Monitor) 
Increased excise duties (EIU)  Support adequate liquidity 
and capitalisation of banks 
under the IMF programme 
July 2009: US$1.57 Billion IMF 
Stand-By Arrangement (IMF). 
The authorities’ programme 
aims to safeguard the 
currency board, consolidate 
public finances and put them 
on a sustainable medium-
term path, maintain adequate 
liquidity and capitalisation of 
banks, secure sufficient 
external financing, and 
restore confidence.   39 
Bulgaria  The 2009 budget does not foresee 
any fiscal stimulus measures 
(Source: EMU report). This is in 
compliance with the 90% rule set in 
the 2009 State Budget Law. 
Specific measures were taken: 
- Salaries in the budgetary sector 
and pensions have been increased 
(1.3% GDP) (EMU report), but 
salaries have been frozen since the 
beginning of 2009. 
- Higher capital spending (0.1% of 
GDP) (EMU report) 
- Lower pension social contribution 
rate (European Commission) 
At the beginning of June, the 
government said it would cut 
ministers' pay by 15 percent 
in addition to already limiting 
spending to 90 percent of the 
budgeted amount (Forbes) 
Limits for the disbursement of 
non-interest expenditure in 
case of a worse-than-
budgeted revenue outcome 
(EMU report) 
Increases in the mandatory 
minimum insured income 
thresholds, in the healthcare 
contribution rate, in excise 
rates and in property 
valuations for local property 
taxes (total: 1.8% of GDP) 
(EMU report) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees up to €50,000, 
following the European 
Commission proposals. No 
capital injections or liquidity 
or bank support have been 
implemented (EMU report) 
 - Maintaining positive 
balance under the 
consolidated fiscal 
programme (3% of GDP as set 
in the Addendum to the last 
Convergence Programme) in 
order to ensure public finance 
long-term sustainability; 
 - Restricting expenditure 
reallocated through the 
budget in the medium term 
(to 40% of GDP  as set in the 
Addendum to the last 
Convergence Programme);   40 
Croatia  Some anti-recession measures and 
maintenance of the standard of 
living of socially vulnerable groups. 
(Ministry of Finance) 
As welfare (pension, health, 
unemployment) expenditure 
increased by 2 billion EURO (about 
4% of GDP), there seems to be no 
space for further increases. 
Government is planning to shorten 
working week and ensure 
additional money for unemployed 
in central government budget. (IPF - 
Institute of Public Finance) 
Mostly symbolic spending 
reductions (about 0.3% of 
GDP) (IPF), including a public-
sector wage cut of 6% 
(Forbes). After cutting 
spending in April 2009, 
further cuts were made in a 
second supplementary budget 
targeted at state aid to public 
enterprises; material costs 
and capital investments were 
cut, salaries of government 
officials were further reduced 
by 5% and parliamentarian 
pensions by 10%. Third 
supplementary budget was 
announced in which further 
cuts to salaries, pensions and 
social rights could be 
expected. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
Parliament approves VAT hike 
from 22 to 23%, additional 
Crisis tax (payroll tax) was 
introduced with two tax rate: 
2% for salaries, pension and 
capital gains until 3,000 HRK 
and 4% above 6,000 HRK. It’s 
considered revision of existing 
taxes by rising existing tax 
rates or broadening tax base 
(Vocational houses tax, 
inheritance and gift taxes, 
yachts etc.). All in all, increase 
of tax burden is small. (IPF) 
Increase in guaranteed 
savings deposits from HRK 
100.000 to HRK 400,000.   
 
No capital injections or 
liquidity or bank support 
have been implemented 
due to good capitalisation 
and profitability of banks 
(Ministry of Finance) 
 
As in previous years, 
government provides 
additional funds for state 
Croatian bank for 
reconstruction and 
development (HBOR) in 
order to provide subsidies 
loans to the private sector. 
(IPF) 
New budget act of 2008 
requires multi-year planning.   41 
Cyprus  Stimulus measures: i) infrastructure 
projects (0.4% of GDP)  speeding up 
the implementation of 
infrastructure and other projects ii) 
tourism (0.32% of GDP) -increase 
the budget for Cyprus Tourism 
Organisation, reduction of VAT rate 
applied to hotel accommodation 
from 8% to 5%, reduction of landing 
fees levied on airlines,  iii) social 
cohesion (1.1% of GDP) 
introduction of a scheme for the 
provision of loans to low-income 
families for the acquisition of their 
primary residence, and promoting 
local tourism through grants for 
low-income families. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
  Increase in excise duty on 
petrol (with compensating 
measures to offset it) (EMU 
report) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees up to €100,000, 
following the European 
Commission proposals. No 
capital injections or liquidity 
or bank support have been 
implemented (EMU report) 
Public expenditure is 
expected to increase only 
slightly, as higher social 
transfers are offset by savings 
in interest payments (EMU 
report)   42 
Czech 
Republic 
Several stimulus packages, 
including higher public-sector 
wages, infrastructure projects (0.4% 
of GDP), bank recapitalisation, and 
lower SS contributions (Ministry of 
Finance).  Reduced SS contributions 
and write-down of capital goods 
will reduce revenue by 0.7% of 
GDP, while indexation of pensions 
will increase spending by 0.2% of 
GDP (EMU report).  
Additional spending equal to about 
1.9% of GDP financed partly from 
the govt's reserve fund (budgeted 
but unused funds from previous 
years) (EIU).  
More welfare provisions for the 
unemployed, better protection for 
employees in bankrupt firms, and 
higher tax deductions for children 
(EIU). 
All these measures would expire at 
the end of 2010 (EIU) 
Impact on General Government 
Sector: 1.95% of GDP; Fiscal 
stimulus: 4.7% of GDP (Czech 
Ministry of Finance) 
Act on Support for Economic 
Growth and Social Stability, an 
amendment to the Act on Social 
Security Insurance and an 
amendment to the Income Tax Act, 
has been approved, the final 
decision will be made by the 
government formed on the basis of 
the early elections in autumn. 
Proposed public-sector wage 
freeze and budget cuts for all 
ministries in 2009 (ordinary 
expenditures), up to 0.6% of 
GDP (Ministry of Finance, 
European Commission) and 
2010 (EIU). Pensions will be 
increased by the minimum 
allowed by law (inflation) 
(EIU).  
   Extension of deposit 
guarantees up to €50,000, 
following the European 
Commission proposals.  
 
No capital injections or 
liquidity or bank support 
have been implemented 
(EMU report) 
   43 
Estonia  Increase in pensions and 
advancement of enforcement of 
the new Labour Law (in total, 0.8% 
of GDP) (European Commission, 
EMU report). Mandatory payments 
into the second-pillar pension funds 
were suspended. 
The government has agreed 
to budget cuts of some 9 
billion kroons (4.0% of GDP), 
including slashing public 
sector salaries by 10 percent 
and abandoning planned 
increases in pensions (raise 
5% from 1st of April 2009; 
initial plan would have been 
approximately 14%)(Forbes). 
During 2009 the general 
government budget position 
has been improved a total of 
EEK 16.1 billion (7.3 percent 
of the GDP). 
Employers’ and employees’ 
contributions will rise to 
finance the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (EIU) 
Increase in social tax 
minimum contribution basis, 
suspension of state 
contributions to the 
mandatory funded pension 
scheme, and increase in the 
unemployment insurance 
contribution rate (in total, 
+1.4% of GDP) (EMU report) 
Increase in VAT and excise 
duties on motor fuel (Forbes, 
June 18) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees up to €50,000, 
following the European 
Commission proposals. No 
capital injections or liquidity 
or bank support have been 
implemented (EMU report) 
The government has reserves 
as a result of past surpluses. 
By the end of June 2009 
general government financial 
assets amounted to 12.95 
billion kroons (5.8% of GDP). 
Two supplementary budgets 
in 2009. Strategy for the next 
four years with strict 
measures to achieve a 
balanced budget by 2012.   44 
Georgia  Increased public expenditure: war 
with Russia, social welfare, 
modernising armed forces, and, 
especially, infrastructure projects. 
Budget approved in December 
included increased spending for 
investment projects, as part of a 
stimulus package (part of it to be 
financed by international donors). 
(EIU) 
Income and dividend tax cuts 
(Bloomberg) 
June 9th,  announced position of 
the Ministry of Finance on spending 
priorities of 312.0 Million GEL (1.5% 
GDP), increased budgetary 
appropriations and content of 
Economic Stimulus Plan (Ministry of 
Finance) 
         Quasi-state agencies could 
increase investments to 
compensate the shortfall left 
by private investors (EIU) 
The National Bank has sold 
reserves to support the (EIU) 
EBRD and IFC joint loan to the 
National Bank ($200mn, 1.8% 
GDP) (EIU)   45 
Hungary  Spending programmes have been 
created to maintain employment 
and protect jobs and to temporarily 
guarantee mortgage payments for 
unemployed people (IMF) 
Modernisation and subsidy 
programme for district heating 
schemes (EMU report) Somewhat 
higher income ceiling in the 
progressive personal income tax 
implies a slight decrease in tax 
burden. 
June 2009: New fiscal plan 
that includes freezing public-
sector wages and cutting 
elements of the pension 
system (WSJ): cut of the 13th 
monthly pension payment for 
some groups of pensioners; 
partly compensated for by 
suspension of the 13th 
monthly salary in the public 
sector and a nominal freeze of 
public wages; cuts in the 
operational costs of 
budgetary institutions; cuts in 
specific government 
programmes; postponement 
of the five-year pension 
correction programme and 
the regular indexation of 
family allowances (all these 
specific measures will amount 
to an estimated 1.05% of the 
GDP) (EMU report) 
Moves towards introducing 
wealth-based taxation in 2010 
(property tax) (EIU) 
Temporary 8% tax (surcharge) 
on the profits of energy 
companies for 2009 and 2010 
(EMU report) 
VAT and excise duties 
increase from July 2009 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees, following the 
European Commission 
proposals. Political 
guarantee of all bank 
deposits (IMF European 
Outlook) 
 
Approved measures for 
capital injections amounting 
to 1.1% of GDP (effective 
capital injections meant 
0.1% of GDP), and 5.9% of 
GDP for approved 
guarantees on bank 
liabilities (have not been 
made effective) (European 
Commission) 
$25.5 bn (20% GDP) credit 
agreement from the IMF, EU, 
and World Bank in October 
2008  (IMF) 
The IMF and the EU agreed to 
allow Hungary to raise its 
budget deficit to 3.9% of GDP 
in 2009 from an earlier 2.9% 
target, limiting the need for 
spending cuts. Fiscal 
responsibility low comprising 
fiscal rules and the 
establishment of an 
independent fiscal council.    46 
Latvia  Social spending to increase by 1.5 
percent of GDP between 2008 and 
2009, moving closer to EU/OECD 
averages (IMF). 
Increase in the minimum wage and 
increase in social payments (EMU 
report) 
Significant budget cuts, in line 
with the conditions offset by 
the international lending 
programme. New budgetary 
cuts in June to come into 
force on July 1: public-sector 
wage bill to fall by 20% – for 
the second time this year –, 
pensions by 10%, and also 
parental benefits will be 
reduced. The whole budget 
will decrease by 10% (source: 
Les Echos, 18/6/09, Latvian 
Ministry of Finance). 
Administrative expenditures 
will be reduced, and boards 
are liquidated in state-owned 
capital companies (Ministry of 
Finance). The expenditure 
cuts approved in June mean 
4% of GDP (FT) 
Increases in VAT and excise 
duties (2.66% of GDP; EMU 
report), and reduction in 
income tax-exempt earning 
level (EIU, Ministry of 
Finance).  
Dividends from state-
controlled corporations will 
be increased (Ministry of 
Finance) 
November-08: Measures 
designed to save the JSC 
Parex Bank: a state 
guarantee covering certain 
existing and new loans, a 
one-year state deposit to 
support the bank's 
immediate liquidity needs, 
and subordinated loans to 
strengthen its capital base. 
May-09: The Latvian 
government will acquire 
newly issued ordinary 
shares and subordinated 
term debt (www.news.cn, 
www.eumonitor.net) 
1.4% of GDP would be 
available for capital 
injections and 10.9% of GDP 
for bank liability guarantees 
(2.8% of GDP has been 
effectively used for granting 
guarantees). 6.1% of GDP 
has been used for effective 
liquidity interventions. 
Deposit guarantee up to 
€50,000 (EMU report) 
€7.5bn (36% GDP) loan from 
the EU, IMF; World Bank, 
some individual EU countries 
and EBRD approved in Dec 
2008/Jan 2009. 
   47 
Lithuania  In February of 2009 the 
Government adopted the Economic 
Recovery Plan, amounting to 
approximately 5 % of GDP with the 
aim of improving conditions for 
doing business, facilitating business 
access to borrowing and 
maintaining jobs. This economic 
recovery plan foresees accelerated 
use of EU financial assistance, 
easing of borrowing for the private 
sector through introduction of 
financial engineering and on-
lending to organisations to 
implement public investment 
projects. The plan was framed with 
the support of loans from the 
European Investment Bank. 
(Ministry of Finance) 
 
Some incentives for enterprises 
have also been approved (tax 
credits, tax exemption for firms 
investing in technology 
modernisation, and shift of public 
investment programmes from long-
term to short-term projects), as 
well as measures to facilitate access 
to liquidity, to promote exports and 
investments and to improve energy 
performance in buildings (Ministry 
of Economy). 
The personal income tax rate was 
cut (EMU report) 
 
The initial 2009 state budget, 
through a comprehensive tax 
reform and expenditure 
reductions, was amended 
leading to savings of 4 percent 
of GDP. The 2009 budget was 
further reviewed in May 2009 
with an additional 
consolidating result of 3.3 
percent of GDP, and in July 
(second revision of the state 
budget) with consolidation of 
0.3 percent of GDP. Package 
of saving measures in Social 
security funds are under 
consideration within 
Government and will be 
presented in autumn. 
(Ministry of Finance) 
 
The expenditure cuts  
included reducing public 
sector wages, investment and 
other current expenditure 
(European Commission). 
Reductions in contributions to 
pension funds, and in 
transfers to local governments 
(European Commission, EMU 
report) 
The government formed in 
December 2008 adopted a 
substantial fiscal 
consolidation package that 
included both wide-ranging 
tax changes and major 
expenditure restraints. On the 
revenue side, the main 
measures included increases 
in VAT and excise duties (but a 
cut in personal income tax); 
increased corporate income 
tax and tax on dividends; 
most tax exemptions 
removed, broadening the tax 
base (European Commission), 
inclusion of some professions 
in the social security system 
(European Commission) 
So far there has been no 
need for capital injections 
or liquidity or bank support. 
However, for the purpose 
of supporting or bailing out 
financial institutions, the 
following steps have been 
taken:  
1. The deposit insurance 
amount has been increased 
from EUR 22,000 to EUR 
100,000, equivalent to the 
amount in litas by paying 
out 100 % of the insured 
deposit. 
2. The draft Law on 
Financial Sector 
Sustainability has been 
prepared, the purpose of 
which is to enable the 
government, when 
necessary, to take measures 
such as state guarantees; 
redemption of bank assets; 
state involvement in bank 
capital; taking bank shares 
for public needs. They 
would be applied to banks 
whose financial situation 
could disturb the smooth 
functioning of the banking 
system.  
3. The guarantee limit of 
LTL 3 billion for loans 
received by the banks or 
financial liabilities assumed 
otherwise, in order to 
strengthen financial 
stability and credibility of 
the banking system in 
Lithuania. 
Speed up absorption of EU 
funds, simplifying companies’ 
procedures (Ministry of 
Economy) 
 
Consultations with IMF and 
World Bank on structural 
reforms (healthcare, 
education, social security 
system, pensions and public 
sector). 
 
End of July 2009: Lithuania’s 
new president has admitted 
that her country could be 
forced to seek help from the 
International Monetary Fund 
if it fails in efforts to raise 
more money from foreign 
capital markets to prop up its 
teetering economy.   48 
Macedonia 
FYR 
Three sets of measures: initial plan 
in November 2008 offering around 
€300m (4.6% GDP) in assistance, to 
companies with liquidity problems 
as well as to companies with good 
financial performances. The most 
important measure was the change 
to tax on profits. Starting from 
January 1st profit is taxed only if 
distributed to capital owners; 
second package adopted in March 
2009, adopted an ambitious seven-
year programme, worth €8bn 
(122% of estimated 2009 GDP, 
17.5% a year if evenly distributed) 
for infrastructure projects, although 
much of that programme will now 
need to be postponed. Third set of 
measures adopted in April 2009, 
divided into three components: a 
revised budget; credit support to 
companies, including subsidised 
interest rates, co-financing and 
credit guarantees, and other 
measures to support companies, 
including measures to facilitate 
exports and imports, reduce costs, 
etc. 
Social security contribution 
reforms, which include cuts in social 
contributions paid by employers 
(EIU) as well as introduction of the 
gross wage system. However, this 
measure was not part of the anti-
crisis packages but regular 
structural reform. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
The revised budget (April) cut 
expenditure by 7% to match 
expected reduced revenue: 
reduction in current 
expenditure, postponement 
of planned increase of public 
administration wages, 
recruitment freeze in the 
administration until end 2009 
(EIU) and reduction in 
expenditures with high 
imports component (mainly 
capital expenditures). 
         49 
Malta  No formal fiscal stimulus package, 
but targeted support, within the 
framework of EU regulations, to 
assist a number of domestic firms 
suffering from the slump in 
international trade, amounting to 
just €3.7m (0.06% GDP) 
The tourism industry, which is being 
hit especially hard by the economic 
slump, has also received some 
modest support, with the 
government having announced a 
capital repayment moratorium for 
up to one year on bank loans to 
hotel owners and operators, albeit 
on a case-by-case basis (EIU). 
The measures are aimed at 
increasing public investment in 
infrastructure and the 
environment, supporting 
manufacturing, tourism and SMEs, 
and households' purchasing power. 
(European Commission, EMU 
report) 
Sharp reduction in state  
subsidies on LPG products 
(EIU) and other subsidies 
(1.4% of GDP) (EMU report) 
Increase in excise duty and 
environmental measures 
(0.4% of GDP) (EMU report) 
The only measure so far 
undertaken to support the 
banks is an extension of 
Malta's deposit guarantee 
scheme to cover deposits 
up to €100,000 (EIU) 
    50 
Moldova  Priority investment programmes 
will be maintained, and social 
security could be enhanced. 
 
Tax amnesty, zero tax on reinvested 
earnings applied even before 2009, 
reducing the interference of 
controlling bodies by reducing the 
number of inspections.  
 
Continued support for small and 
medium size enterprises.  
 
Imports for investment purposes 
are exempted from VAT.  
 
Further liberalisation of the 
economy. (Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank) 
Lack of an operating 
parliament in the first half of 
2009 hindered decision 
making, but government 
implemented budget cuts 
under its responsibility and 
prepared proposals for the 
new parliament. The 
measures includes: cuts of 
recurrent spending by 20%, 
including administration 
spending; postponement of 
any new wage bill increasing; 
reduction of vacant positions 
and a recruitment freeze; 
revision of legislation in terms 
of the abolition of bonuses 
and privileges in the public 
sector; reduction of 
enrolment in higher and 
secondary special educational 
institutions; closure or 
integration of ineffective 
educational institutions. 
(Ministry of Finance) 
Enhanced tax administration.    Financial system is not as 
badly hit because little 
western integration. Only 
three commercial banks are 
backed by foreign capital. 
The Central Bank of 
Moldova has increased 
liquidity to support the 
credit flow to businesses by 
commercial banks as well as 
reduced basic refinancing 
rate (from 21% in 
September 2008 to 11.5% 
in July 2009) and mandatory 
reserves of commercial 
banks (from 22%  to 16%). 
(Ministry of Finance, Central 
Bank) 
The IMF's three-year poverty 
reduction and growth facility 
expired in May-09 but it 
seems unlikely that any 
further lending will be 
approved until a new 
government has been formed 
(EIU).   51 
Montenegro  For 2009, approximately €18 million 
(0.5% GDP) was budgeted for 
projects aimed at creating jobs 
(training programmes) and for 
stimulating entrepreneurship and 
self-employment. The government 
approved measures aimed at 
decreasing taxes, increasing net 
income, early redemption of 
internal debt, abolishment of 
certain fees, support to 
entrepreneurship, as well as 
readiness to provide long term 
financial assistance to domestic 
banks through cooperation with 
international financial institutions 
(Ministry of Finance) 
Decrease public 
administration spending (no 
new public jobs, reduction of 
current spending) (Ministry of 
Finance). 
   The Central Bank of 
Montenegro will allow the 
commercial banks to use up 
to 20% of compulsory 
reserves for the purchase of 
treasury bills, increasing 
liquidity (Ministry of 
Finance) 
Plans for cuts in tax and social 
contribution rates, and for 
increases in capital and social 
expenditure will substantially 
increase the deficit in 2009 
and beyond, implying a risk of 
rapidly rising public debt 
(IMF).   52 
Poland  Poland introduced a stimulus 
package in November 2008. After 
deducting the funds previously 
included in the draft budget (state 
guarantee ceiling of PLN 15 billion, 
expenditure related to the 
utilisation of EU funds of PLN 9.5 bn 
(0.7% GDP), PIT rate reduction and 
VAT changes of PLN 8 bn (0.6% 
GDP)) the balance remaining for the 
new measures is just under PLN 
56.8 bn (4.33% GDP), of which PLN 
45 bn (3.4% GDP) is a potential 
increase in lending to banks and 
firms resulting from the activation 
of state guarantees, and PLN 10 bn 
(0.76% GDP) represents a potential 
increase in expenditure financed 
with EU Funds (RGE Monitor). 
Abolition of the top 40% rate of 
personal income tax in Jan-09 (EIU). 
Lower taxes on business (EMU 
report) 
Reduction in subsidies and 
replacement of early pensions 
with less costly ’bridge 
pensions’. Reduction in 
government intermediate 
consumption (EMU report). 
Increase in excise duties (0.2% 
of GDP) (EMU report) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees, following the 
European Commission 
proposals, up to €50,000 
(EMU report).  
 
No capital injections, 
liquidity support or 
guarantee on bank liabilities 
have been approved. 
IMF flexible credit line   53 
Romania  Investment programmes will be 
maintained and social security 
enhanced. Ambitious capital 
expenditure programmes for 
infrastructure, education and 
health. The IMF-supported 
programme provides room for 
additional spending of RON 250 
million (amounting to 0.05 percent 
of GDP) in 2009 and RON 500 
million (0.1 percent of GDP) in 2010 
to improve social protection for the 
most vulnerable groups during the 
economic downturn (EIU, IMF) 
Increase public investment by 1% of 
GDP (EMU report) 
The budget was modified in 
April 2009 to include 
considerable fiscal tightening 
in the three final quarters of 
the year. 
Expenditure cuts were 
concentrated on the public 
sector wage bill and public 
sector consumption (all 
ministries will have budgetary 
cuts except for social 
spending) (EIU). Reductions 
are estimated in -2.2% of GDP 
(EMU report) 
Flat-rate income and profit 
tax and VAT tax were 
unchanged, but introduction 
of a controversial ’lump sum’ 
tax (regressive turnover tax) 
for companies (EIU) 
Increase of social contribution 
rate and excise duties. Update 
of the tax base for local 
property taxes (in total, 1% of 
GDP) (EMU report) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees up to €50,000, 
following the European 
Commission proposals 
(EMU report) 
€20bn loan from the EU, IMF 
(Stand-by agreement), World 
Bank, EIB and EBRD approved 
in May 2009. 
Structural reforms in 
education and healthcare 
(source: EIU May-09) On-
going process for fiscal 
responsibility law and unified 
public wages system.   54 
Russian 
Federation 
The federal expenditure target has 
been increased by 7% compared 
with the original level of the budget 
(EIU). 
1.6 trillion roubles (4.1% of GDP) 
are earmarked for anti-crisis 
measures. 
Expenditure cuts: general 
administration, various 
investment programmes – 
road building (EIU) 
One-off injection from the 
investment income earned by 
stabilisation funds (January) 
(EIU) 
Capital injections to banks 
(EIU) 
Russian government capital 
has gone primarily to larger, 
more systemically 
important banks as the 
government tries to restart 
lending to consumers and 
companies. Although Russia 
has over 1000 banks, 100 of 
them account for 90% of 
the transactions (Moodys). 
The reserve requirement, 
which was cut to just 0.5% 
in October 2008, was raised 
to 1.5% in June and is 
scheduled to rise to 2.5% in 
August. This compares with 
a reserve requirement of 
8% before the cuts started, 
so the situation is still far 
from normal (EIU). 
The Russian Central Bank and 
the Bank for Economic 
development also will provide 
money for government anti-
crisis measures (EIU) 
First budgetary deficit since 
1999. The deficit will be 
financed by drawing on the 
reserve fund, which manages 
over $100 billion and is one of 
Russia's two sovereign wealth 
funds (RGE Monitor), but 
Russia also plans to return to 
the international bond market 
in 2010 (EIU). 
Exchange rate defence: 1/3 of 
foreign exchange reserves 
were lost. After that the 
rouble depreciated by about 
20% 
All fiscal rules were cancelled 
– to be restored later. 
Pressure to launch budget 
reforms discussed but not 
implemented for about a 
decade.   55 
Serbia  Increase in pensions in late 2008. 
A stimulus package includes a 
cheap lending facility to Serbian 
companies that do not lay off 
workers, and for lending to 
stimulate exports and to grant a 
new consumer credit line for the 
purchase of construction materials 
(EIU) 
The fiscal deficit targets for 
2009–10 have been raised, 
but additional fiscal 
adjustment measures—
mainly falling on recurrent 
spending—are also being 
taken (IMF) 
Tax increases have been 
rejected by the government 
(EIU) 
   Stand-by agreement with the 
IMF (January 2009). In May, 
the agreement was extended 
(until March-11) and 
increased up to €2.9 bn (10% 
of Serbia's GDP).  
 
The government’s unilateral 
implementation of the interim 
trade agreement with the EU 
led to a decline in customs 
collections (EIU)   56 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.5% of GDP for anti-crisis 
measures, counterbalanced by 
savings in other areas (EMU report). 
Nov 2008 plan was aimed primarily 
at accelerating public infrastructure 
investments (also because of 
difficulties in finding private 
financing), energy savings and 
energy security, reduced taxes for 
low-income employees, simpler 
business bureaucratic procedures, 
legal reinforcement of EIB 
instruments, strengthening 
employment services, and speeding 
up payments by the state to 
businesses (Ministry of Finance) 
Measures: temporary increase in 
tax-free income, changes in welfare 
measures, subsidy for the purchase 
of new cars. 
The government may also need to 
provide budget financing to the 
social insurer (EIU). 
 
February 2009: two other stimulus 
packages, primarily focusing on the 
labour market and on boosting 
demand (Ministry of Finance) 
Cut expenditure by savings on 
state consumption, merging 
ministries and abolishing 
some regional state 
administration offices (EIU) 
Increased excise duties on 
tobacco and changes in social 
contributions and capital 
transfers from the second 
pension pillar (total: 0.6% 
GDP) (EMU report) 
From 1 January 2009 
foreign bank branches that 
accept deposits in the 
Slovak Republic under an 
EU single banking licence 
are permitted to join the 
Slovak deposit protection 
system. The measure of the 
National Bank of Slovakia 
on the liquidity of banks 
and branches of foreign 
banks, in effect from 15 
November 2008, introduced 
more stringent 
requirements on liquidity 
management, especially by 
means of a new liquidity 
indicator (Ministry of 
Finance) 
Extension of deposit 
guarantees, following the 
European Commission 
proposals (unlimited for 
physical persons and some 
categories of legal persons) 
(IMF European Outlook) 
 
No financial support to the 
banking sector. 
Stimulus plan measures 
approved in Nov-08 included 
improved absorption of EU 
funds. Plan followed by two 
other stimulus packages.   57 
Slovenia  Recovery package adopted in Dec 
2008: Offset some of the shortfall in 
economic activity by undertaking 
infrastructure projects and 
providing liquidity to companies 
(EIU) 
Three anti-crisis packages have 
been implemented. Among the 
measures:  
- Elimination of payroll tax, 
reduction of the corporate tax rate, 
and additional investment 
allowance for companies and sole 
proprietors (1% GDP) (EMU report) 
- Wage subsidy for shorter hours 
worked, support for SMEs and 
start-up companies, subsidies for 
investment in new technologies 
and R&D (EMU report). Total 
estimated: 0.9% of GDP 
- Implementation of a decision to 
eliminate ’wage disparities’ in 
public sector 
- Increases in specific transfers in 
kind  
(EMU report) 
Measures to restrain the 
wage bill (EMU report) 
Increase in excise duties (0.9% 
of GDP) (EMU report) 
The government will make 
available €12bn (30% GDP) 
in guarantees for bank 
loans, as well as temporary 
unlimited guarantees for all 
retail bank deposits and 
savings.  
Consultations on structural 
reforms (healthcare, 
pensions, social security 
system, labour market and 
public sector). 
Implementation, if agreement 
is reached, will not be 
immediate (Slovenia is among 
the group of countries that 
will have to increase their 
age-related public 
expenditure by the most) 
(EIU).   58 
Turkey  Since May 2008, various measures 
to boost employment and regional 
development through public 
investment, to increase credit to 
SMEs, increased budget transfers to 
local governments, VAT reductions, 
and increased subsidies (Ministry of 
Finance).  
Various tax cuts for individuals, 
businesses and consumers, and cuts 
in social security contributions.  
New stimulus measures have been 
announced in June 2009 with a 
strong regional dimension 
(classifying provinces into four 
regions and imposing different tax 
and subsidy incentives across 
regions). Incentives include 
corporate tax cuts, exemptions for 
companies paying social security 
premiums for new workers, interest 
rate subsidies, increased public-
sector hiring, regional investment 
incentives for 12 specific sectors, 
extension of vocational education 
(EIU, Ministry of Finance). 
      No serious problem in the 
banking system. 
Discussions on a possible 
stand-by loan agreement with 
the IMF, but no apparent 
progress. New fiscal rule in 
2010.   59 
Ukraine  The Fund-supported programme 
maintained the inflation indexing of 
a social spending (0.8% of GDP). 
(Ministry of Finance) Measures 
include (i) protection of the poor 
against gas price increases through 
the life-line tariff and housing and 
utility allowance; (ii) protection of 
the unemployed through the 
unemployment insurance system; 
and (iii) expansion of two well-
targeted social safety programmes 
identified by the World Bank (IMF) 
A sharp tightening of fiscal 
policy is expected in 2009, 
although the IMF has agreed 
to a deficit of 6% of GDP 
instead of the initially planned 
4%, due to worst than 
expected output decline 
(IMF). Much of the fiscal 
tightening is likely to come 
through reining in 
expenditure on goods and 
services in non-priority areas 
(EIU) 
Increased pension 
contributions by private 
entrepreneurs; higher 
electricity and gas tariffs for 
those that consume more 
(EIU) 
Bank recapitalisation 
programme: the state will 
receive full control over the 
recapitalised bank 
IMF Stand-by agreement 
approved in November 2008 
($16.4 bn – 9.1% of GDP). 
(IMF) 
The authorities agreed to the 
introduction of a floating 
exchange rate, to ’help the 
economy adjust to external 
shocks, discouraging 
dollarisation and excessive 
risk-taking by unhedged 
borrowers, and allowing 
monetary policy to focus on 
inflation objectives’, 
tightening monetary policy to 
avoid excessive exchange rate 
depreciation, if needed (IMF) 
 
 
 
 
 